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Abstract
Frequently, communication between two principals reveals their identities and presence to third
parties. These privacy breaches can occur even if security protocols are in use; indeed, they may
even be caused by security protocols. However, with some care, security protocols can provide
authentication for principals that wish to communicate while protecting them from monitoring
by third parties. We discuss the problem of private authentication and present two protocols
for private authentication of mobile principals. Our protocols allow two mobile principals to
communicate when they meet at a location if they wish to do so, without the danger of tracking
by third parties. We also present the analysis of one of the protocols in the applied pi calculus.
We establish authenticity and secrecy properties. Although such properties are fairly standard,
their formulation in the applied pi calculus makes an original use of process equivalences. In
addition, we treat identity-protection properties, thus exploring a formal model of privacy.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Privacy, authenticity, and the applied pi calculus
Although privacy may coexist with communication, it often does not, and there is an
intrinsic tension between them. Often, e;ective communication between two principals
requires that they reveal their identities to each other. Still, they may wish to reveal
nothing to others. Third parties should not be able to infer the identities of the two
principals, nor to monitor their movements and their communication patterns. For better
or for worse, they often can. In particular, a mobile principal may advertise its presence
at a location in order to discover and to communicate with certain other principals at
the location, thus revealing its presence also to third parties.
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Authentication protocols may help in addressing these privacy breaches, as follows.
When a principal A wishes to communicate with a principal B, and is willing to disclose
its identity and presence to B but not to other principals, A might demand that B prove
its identity before revealing anything. An authentication protocol can provide this proof.
It can also serve to establish a secure channel for subsequent communication between
A and B.
However, authentication protocols are not an immediate solution, and they can in
fact be part of the problem. Privacy is not one of the explicit goals of common au-
thentication protocols. These protocols often send names and credentials in cleartext,
allowing any eavesdropper to see them. An eavesdropper may also learn substantial
information from encrypted packets, even without knowing the corresponding decryp-
tion keys; for example, the packets may contain key identiCers that link them to other
packets and to certain principals. Furthermore, in the course of authentication, a princi-
pal may reveal its identity to its interlocutor before knowing the interlocutor’s identity
with certainty. If A and B wish to communicate but each wants to protect its identity
from third parties, who should reveal and prove theirs Crst?
This last diFculty is more signiCcant in peer-to-peer communication than in
client-server communication, although the desire for privacy appears in both
settings.
• In client-server systems, the identity of servers is seldom protected. However, the
identity of clients is not too hard to protect, and this is often deemed worthwhile.
For example, in the SSL protocol [20], a client can Crst establish an “anonymous”
connection, then authenticate with the protection of this connection, communicating
its identity only in encrypted form. An eavesdropper can still obtain some addressing
information, but this information may be of limited value if the client resides behind
a Crewall and a proxy. (Similarly, the Skeme protocol [26] provides support for
protecting the identity of the initiator of a protocol session, but not the identity of
the responder; the JFK protocol [8] is also asymmetric in this respect.)
• The symmetry of peer-to-peer communication makes it less plausible that one of the
parties in an exchange would be willing to volunteer its identity Crst. Privacy may
nevertheless be attractive. In particular, mobile principals may want to communicate
with nearby peers without allowing others to monitor them (cf. Bluetooth [12] and
its weaknesses [25]). Thus, privacy seems more problematic and potentially more
interesting in the Nuid setting of mobile, peer-to-peer communication.
This paper gives a deCnition of a privacy property (Crst informally, then in a process
calculus). This property implies that each principal may reveal and prove its identity
to certain other principals, and hide it from the rest. The deCnition applies even if all
parties are peers and have such privacy requirements.
Standard authentication protocols do not satisfy the privacy property. However, we
show two protocols that do, and undoubtedly there are others (to the extent that infor-
mally described protocols can satisfy informally deCned properties). In our protocols,
a session between two principals A and B consists of messages encrypted under public
keys and under session keys in such a way that only A and B discover each other’s
identity. The protocols di;er from standard protocols by the absence of cleartext iden-
tity information. More subtly, they rely on some mild but non-trivial assumptions on
M. Abadi, C. Fournet / Theoretical Computer Science 322 (2004) 427–476 429
the underlying cryptographic primitives. One of the protocols also includes a subtle
“decoy” message in order to thwart certain active attacks.
Our protocols do not assume that the principals A and B have a long-term shared
secret. Neither do they require an infrastructure of on-line trusted third parties, or
suppose that the world is organized into domains and that each principal has a home
domain. In this respect, the protocols contrast with previous ones for related purposes
(see for example [30,36,11,9] and Section 9). Because of their weak infrastructure
needs, the protocols are consistent with ad hoc networking.
As an example, consider a mobile principal A that communicates with others when
they are in the same (physical or virtual) location. In order to establish connections, A
might constantly broadcast “hello, I am A, does anyone want to talk?”. An eavesdropper
could then detect A’s presence at a particular location. An eavesdropper could even
monitor A’s movements without much diFculty, given sensors at suFciently many
locations. Our protocols are designed with this scenario in mind. Suppose that two
principals A and B arrive anonymously at a location. Although A and B may know of
each other in advance, they need not have a long-term shared key. Furthermore, neither
may be certain a priori that the other one is present at this location. If they wish to
communicate with one another, our protocols will enable them to do it, without the
danger of being monitored by others.
This paper also presents the analysis of one of our protocols in the applied pi
calculus [2], a recent variant of the pi calculus. This analysis is worthwhile for several
reasons:
• As we discussed above, the protocol aims to guarantee that third parties do not learn
the identity of protocol participants. Although this property and similar ones appear
prominently in several recent protocol designs, they have hardly been speciCed and
proved precisely to date. Therefore, this paper develops an approach for stating and
deriving those properties.
• In addition, the protocol is for a standard purpose, namely establishing a session (with
associated cryptographic keys), and it is concerned with standard security properties,
such as authenticity and secrecy. Therefore, the analysis of the protocol exempliCes
concepts and techniques relevant to many other protocols.
• The protocol includes some delicate features, and is not a trivial example invented in
order to illustrate formal techniques. On the other hand, the protocol remains fairly
simple, so we can give relatively concise treatments of its main properties.
In the applied pi calculus, the constructs of the classic pi calculus can be used to
represent concurrent systems that communicate on channels, and function symbols can
be used to represent cryptographic operations and other operations on data. Large
classes of important attacks can also be expressed in the applied pi calculus, as contexts.
These include the typical attacks for which a symbolic, mostly “black-box” view of
cryptography suFces (but not for example some lower-level attacks that depend on
timing behavior or on probabilities). Thus, in general, the applied pi calculus serves
for describing and reasoning about many of the central aspects of security protocols.
In particular, it is an appropriate setting for the analysis of the protocol for private
authentication. Some of the properties of the protocol can be nicely captured in the
form of equivalences between processes. Moreover, some of the properties are sensitive
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to the equations satisCed by the cryptographic functions upon which the protocol relies.
The applied pi calculus is well-suited for expressing those equivalences and those
equations.
In a sense, private authentication is about hiding the names (or identities) of proto-
col participants, while the applied pi calculus permits hiding the names that represent
private communication channels and secret cryptographic keys (through the restriction
construct ). Despite this superCcial coincidence, the name hiding of private authenti-
cation and that of the applied pi calculus are rather di;erent. However, the name hiding
of the applied pi calculus is crucial for expressing the protocol under consideration and
for deriving the equivalences that express its properties.
The next section deCnes and discusses the privacy property sketched above. Section 3
presents the assumptions on which our protocols rely. Section 4 develops the two
protocols and some optimizations and extensions. Section 5 explains the applied pi
calculus. Section 6 shows how to express one of our protocols in the applied pi calculus.
Section 7 treats the authenticity and secrecy properties of this protocol; Section 8, its
identity-protection properties. Section 9 discusses some related problems and related
work (including, in particular, work on message untraceability). Section 10 concludes.
An appendix contains proofs for the main claims of Sections 7 and 8.
Parts of this paper have appeared in preliminary form in proceedings [1,19].
2. The problem
Although we do not aim to provide a general deCnition of privacy (partly because one
might have to be too vague or empty), we focus on the following frequent scenario in
which privacy is a central concern: two or more mobile interlocutors wish to communi-
cate securely, protecting their messages and also their identities from third parties. This
scenario arises often in mobile telephony and mobile computing [18,34,30,36,9,25]. In
these contexts, roaming users may want to conceal their identities from others and even
from infrastructure providers and operators. Furthermore, identity protection is a goal
of several recent protocols for communication at the IP level [26,8].
More speciCcally, suppose that a principal A is willing to engage in communication
with some set of other principals SA (which may change over time), and that A is
willing to reveal and even prove its identity to these principals. This proof may be
required, for instance if A wishes to make a sensitive request from each of these
principals, or if these principals would reveal some sensitive data only to A. The
problem is to enable A to authenticate to principals in SA without requiring A to
compromise its privacy by revealing its identity or SA more broadly:
(1) A should be able to prove its identity to principals in SA, and to establish authen-
ticated and private communication channels with them.
(2) A should not have to indicate its identity (and presence) to any principal outside
SA.
(3) Although an individual principal may deduce whether it is in SA from A’s will-
ingness to communicate, A should not have to reveal anything more about SA.
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Goal 1 is common; many cryptographic protocols and security infrastructures have been
designed with this goal in mind.
Goal 2 is less common. As discussed above, it is seldom met with standard protocols,
but it seems attractive. When C is a principal outside SA, this goal implies that A should
not have to prove its identity to C, but it also means that A should not have to give
substantial hints of its identity to C.
We could consider strengthening goal 2 by saying that A should have to reveal its
identity only to principals B∈ SA such that A∈ SB, in other words, to principals with
which A can actually communicate. On the other hand, if SB is under B’s control, B
could let A∈ SB, or pretend that this is the case, in order to learn A’s identity. (We
revisit whether SB is under B’s control with the deCnition of compliant principal in
Section 6.5.)
Goal 3 concerns a further privacy guarantee. Like goal 2, it is somewhat unusual,
seldom met with standard techniques, but attractive from a privacy perspective. It might
be relaxed slightly, in particular allowing A to reveal the approximate size of SA.
Note that A may be willing to engage in anonymous communication with some set
of principals in addition to SA. We expect that A is programmed and conCgured so that
it does not spuriously reveal its identity (or other private data) to those other principals
accidentally. In actual systems, however, principals may well reveal and even broadcast
their names unnecessarily.
3. Assumptions
This section introduces the assumptions on which our protocols rely. They generally
concern communication and cryptography, and the power of the adversary in these
respects. (Menezes et al. [29] give the necessary background in cryptography; we rely
only on elementary concepts.) Although the assumptions may not hold in many real
systems, they are realistic enough to be implementable, and advantageously simple.
3.1. Communication
We assume that messages do not automatically reveal the identity of their senders
and receivers—for example, by mentioning them in headers. When the location of the
sender of a message can be obtained, for example, by triangulation, this assumption
implies that the location does not reveal the sender’s identity. This assumption also
entails some diFculties in routing messages. Techniques for message untraceability (see
for example [15,32,33] and Section 9) suggest some sophisticated solutions. Focusing
on a relatively simple but important case, we envision that all messages are broadcast
within some small area, such as a room or a building.
We aim to protect against an adversary that can intercept any message sent on
a public channel (within the small area under consideration or elsewhere). In addi-
tion, the adversary is active: it can send any message that it can compute. Thus, the
adversary is essentially the standard adversary for security protocols, as described, for
example, by Needham and Schroeder [31].
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3.2. Cryptography
We also assume that each principal A has a public key KA and a corresponding pri-
vate key K−1A , and that the association between principals and public keys is known.
This association can be implemented with the help of a mostly o;-line certiCcation
authority. In this case, some additional care is required: fetching certiCcates and other
interactions with the certiCcation authority should not compromise privacy goals. Al-
ternatively, the association is trivial if we name principals by their public keys, for
example as in SPKI [17]. Similarly, it is also trivial if we use ordinary principal
names as public keys, with an identity-based cryptosystem [37]. Therefore, we may
basically treat public keys as principal names.
When K−1 is a private key, we write {M}K−1 for M signed using K−1, in such
a way that M can be extracted from {M}K−1 and the signature veriCed using the
corresponding public key K . As usual, we assume that signatures are unforgeable.
Similarly, 1 when K is a public key, we write {M}K for the encryption of M using
K . We expect some properties of the encryption scheme:
(1) Only a principal that knows the corresponding private key K−1 should be able to
recover the plaintext of a message encrypted under a public key K .
(2) Furthermore, decrypting a message with a private key K−1 should succeed only if
the message was encrypted under the corresponding public key K , and the success
or failure of a decryption should be evident to the principal who performs it.
(3) Finally, encryption should be which-key concealing [7,10,13], in the following
sense. Someone who sees a message encrypted under a public key K should not
be able to tell that it is under K without knowledge of the plaintext or the corre-
sponding private key K−1, even with knowledge of K and other messages under
K . Similarly, someone who sees several di;erent messages encrypted under a pub-
lic key K should not be able to tell that they are under the same key without
knowledge of the corresponding private key K−1.
Property 1 is essential and standard. Properties 2 and 3 are not entirely standard. They
are not implied by standard computational speciCcations of encryption (e.g., [21]) but
appear in formal models (e.g., [5]). Property 2 can be implemented by including ap-
propriate redundancy in encrypted messages, without compromising secrecy properties.
It is not essential, but we Cnd it convenient, particularly for the second protocol and
its enhancements. Property 3 is satisCed with standard cryptosystems based on the
discrete-logarithm problem [10,13], but it excludes implementations that tag all en-
cryptions with key identiCers. Although the rigorous study of this property is relatively
recent, it seems to be implicitly assumed in earlier work; for example, it seems to be
necessary for the desired anonymity properties of the Skeme protocol [26].
1 These notations are concise and fairly memorable, but perhaps somewhat misleading. In particular, they
imply that the same key pair is used for both public-key signatures and encryptions, and that the underlying
algorithms are similar for both kinds of operations (as in the RSA cryptosystem). We do not need to assume
these properties.
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4. Two protocols
This section shows two protocols that address the goals of Section 2. It also discusses
some variants of the protocols.
The two protocols are based on standard primitives and techniques (in particular
on public-key cryptography), and resemble standard protocols. The Crst protocol uses
digital signatures and requires that principals have loosely synchronized clocks. The
second protocol uses only encryption and avoids the synchronization requirement, at
the cost of an extra message. The second protocol draws attention to diFculties in
achieving privacy against an active adversary.
Undoubtedly, other protocols satisfy the goals of Section 2. In particular, these goals
seem relatively easy to satisfy when all principals conCde in on-line authentication
servers. However, the existence of ubiquitous trusted servers may not be a reasonable
assumption. The protocols of this section do not rely on such trusted third parties.
4.1. First protocol
In the Crst protocol, when a principal A wishes to talk to another principal B, and
B is willing to talk to a set of principals SB, A and B proceed as follows:
• A generates fresh key material K and a timestamp T , and sends out
“hello”; {“hello”; KA; {KA; KB; K; T}K−1A }KB :
The tag “hello” indicates the type of the message; it is not essential in this particular
protocol. The key material may simply be a session key, for subsequent communi-
cation; it may also consist of several session keys and identiCers for those keys. The
signature means that the principal with public key KA (that is, A) says that it has
generated the key material K for communicating with the principal with public key
KB (that is, B) near time T . The explicit mention of KB is crucial for security (see
[6]).
• Upon receipt of any message that consists of “hello” and (apparently) a ciphertext,
the recipient B tries to decrypt the second component using its private key. If the
decryption yields a key KA and a signed statement of the form {KA; KB; K; T}K−1A ,
then B extracts KA and K , veriCes the signature using KA, ensures that the message
is not a replay using the timestamp T , and checks that A∈ SB. If the plaintext is not
of the expected form, if the message is a replay, or if A =∈ SB, then B does nothing.
• A and B may use K for encrypting subsequent messages. Each of these messages
may be tagged with a key identiCer, derived from K but independent of A and B.
When A or B receives a tagged message, the key identiCer suggests the use of K
for decrypting the message.
This protocol is based on the Denning–Sacco public-key protocol and its corrected
version [16,6]. Noticeably, however, this protocol does not include any identities in
cleartext. In addition, the protocol requires stronger assumptions on encryption, specif-
ically that public-key encryption under KB be which-key concealing. This property is
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needed so that A’s encrypted message does not reveal the identity of its (intended)
recipient B.
When A wishes to communicate with several principals B1; : : : ; Bn at the same time
(for example, when A arrives at a new location), A may simply start n instances of
the protocol in parallel, sending di;erent key material to each of B1; : : : ; Bn. Those of
B1; : : : ; Bn who are present and willing to communicate with A will be able to do so
using the key material. (Section 4.4 describes optimizations of the second protocol for
this situation.)
4.2. Second protocol
In the second protocol, when a principal A wishes to talk to another principal B,
and B is willing to talk to a set of principals SB, A and B proceed as follows:
• A generates a fresh, unpredictable nonce NA, and sends out
“hello”; {“hello”; NA; KA}KB :
(In security protocols, nonces are quantities generated for the purpose of being recent;
they are typically used in challenge-response exchanges.)
• Upon receipt of a message that consists of “hello” and (apparently) a ciphertext, the
recipient B checks that it is not a replay 2 and tries to decrypt the second component
using its private key. If the decryption succeeds, then B extracts the corresponding
nonce NA and key KA, checks that A∈ SB, generates a fresh, unpredictable nonce NB,
and sends out
“ack”; {“ack”; NA; NB; KB}KA :
If the message is a replay, if the decryption fails, if the plaintext is not of the
expected form, or if A =∈ SB, then B sends out a “decoy” message. This message
should basically look like B’s other message. In particular, it may have the form
“ack”; {N}K ;
where N is a fresh nonce (with padding, as needed) and only B knows K−1, or it
may be indistinguishable from a message of this form.
• Upon receipt of a message that consists of “ack” and (apparently) a ciphertext, A tries
to decrypt the second component using its private key. If the decryption succeeds,
then A extracts the corresponding nonces NA and NB and key KB, and checks that it
has recently sent NA encrypted under KB. If the decryption or the checks fail, then
A does nothing.
• Subsequently, A and B may use NA and NB as shared secrets. In particular, A and B
may use NB as a session key, or they may compute session keys by concatenating
2 The Cltering of replays by B is not in the original description of the protocol [1], and may be avoided
under certain conditions on B’s behavior, but we believe that it is a reasonable reCnement, with useful
consequences. We omit the details of how to implement the Cltering, which are fairly standard; as usual,
some but not all implementations preserve security properties.
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and hashing the two nonces. They may also derive key identiCers, much as in the
Crst protocol.
In summary, the message Now of a successful exchange is
A → B: “hello”; {“hello”; NA; KA}KB ;
B → A: “ack”; {“ack”; NA; NB; KB}KA :
Section 4.4 describes variants of this basic pattern, for example (as mentioned above)
for the case where A wishes to communicate with n principals B1; : : : ; Bn.
This protocol has some similarities with the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol
[31] and others [27,26]. However, like the Crst protocol, this one does not include
any identities in cleartext, and again that is not quite enough for privacy. As in the
Crst protocol, public-key encryption should be which-key concealing so that encrypted
messages do not reveal the identities of their (intended) recipients. Furthermore, the
delicate use of the decoy message is important:
• B’s decoy message is unfortunately necessary in order to prevent an attack where a
malicious principal C =∈ SB computes and sends
“hello”; {“hello”; NC; KA}KB
and then deduces B’s presence and A∈ SB by noticing a response. In order to prevent
this attack, the decoy message should look to C like it has the form:
“ack”; {“ack”; NC; NB; KB}KA :
• B’s response to A when A =∈ SB should look as though B was someone else, lest
A infer B’s presence. Since B sends a decoy message when its decryption fails, it
should also send one when A =∈ SB.
The decoy message “ack”, {N}K is intended to address both of these requirements.
4.3. Properties and limitations
Intuitively, the protocols are supposed to establish shared secrets between A and B.
At the very least, we would expect that A and B, and only them, can obtain a ses-
sion key from these secrets. We would expect, moreover, that this key be essentially
independent of any other data. For example, it should not be possible for an attacker
without access to the key to compute a ciphertext under the key from a record of the
protocol messages. In short, the key should behave much like a pre-established shared
key. The only observable di;erences between running the protocol and having a pre-
established shared key should be that an attacker can disrupt a protocol run, making it
fail, and that an attacker can notice that the protocol generates some opaque messages.
Our results of Section 7 provide a more precise statement of this comparison, in the
form of an equivalence, for the second protocol.
The protocols are also supposed to assure A and B of each other’s identity. However,
the two participants have somewhat di;erent states in this respect at the conclusion of
a key exchange.
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• With the Crst protocol, after receiving and checking A’s message, B has evidence
that A is attempting to establish a session. On the other hand, A knows nothing about
B’s presence and interest in a session until receiving messages under the session key.
• With the second protocol, after receiving and checking B’s message, A has evidence
that it shares the session key with the principal B that responded. On the other hand,
B has evidence that it shares the session key at most with A, but cannot be certain that
A initiated the protocol run. Any other principal C might have contacted B pretending
to be A, but then C will not obtain the key. Only after further communication can
B be sure of A’s participation in the session.
In addition, the protocols are supposed to protect the identity of the participants. This
should mean, in particular, that an attacker cannot learn anything when A wishes to
communicate with B but not vice versa. It should also mean that an attacker cannot
distinguish a run between A and B from a run between two other principals A′ and B′,
under appropriate hypotheses. The hypotheses should say, for example, that B is not
the attacker, since B learns A’s identity. The hypotheses should also consider what the
participants can do besides running the protocol. For example, if A were to broadcast
“A has a secret!” after every protocol run, then A’s identity would clearly not be
protected. Similarly, if A would only contact C after sessions with B, then C could
infer B’s recent presence from A’s behavior. In general, the hypotheses need to address
possible leaks not caused by the protocol itself. Section 8 develops these hypotheses
and gives our privacy results, also relying on equivalences.
The protocols do not provide location information, so they do not guarantee that
two principals A and B that establish a session are necessarily in the same location.
In a distributed system, a relay could allow A and B to establish a session remotely,
perhaps with the intention of misleading A and B. Assuming that each principal can
name its own location, the protocols can easily be extended with location indicators in
order to detect relays across locations.
4.4. E2ciency considerations
Both protocols can be rather ineFcient in some respects. These ineFciencies are
largely unavoidable consequences of the goals of private authentication.
• A generates its message and sends it before having any indication that B is present
and willing to communicate. In other situations, A might have Crst engaged in a
lightweight handshake with B, sending the names A and B and waiting for an ac-
knowledgment. Alternatively, both A and B might have broadcast their names and
their interest in communicating with nearby principals. Here, these preliminary mes-
sages are in conNict with the privacy goals, even though they do not absolutely prove
the presence of A and B to an eavesdropper. Some compromises may be possible;
for example, A and B may publish some bits of information about their identities if
those bits are not deemed too sensitive. In addition, in the second protocol, A may
precompute its message.
• Following the protocols, B may examine many messages that were encrypted under
the public keys of other principals. This examination may be costly, perhaps opening
the door to a denial-of-service attack against B. In other situations, A might have
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included the name B, the key KB, or some identiCer for KB in clear in its message,
as a hint for B. Here, again, the optimization is in conNict with the privacy goals,
and some compromises may be possible.
The second protocol introduces some further ineFciencies, but those can be addressed
as follows:
• In the second protocol, A may process many acknowledgments that were encrypted
under the public keys of other principals. This problem can be solved through the
use of a connection identiCer: A can create a fresh identiCer I , send it to B, and B
can return I in clear as a hint that A should decrypt its message:
A → B: “hello”; I; {“hello”; NA; KA}KB ;
B → A: “ack”; I; {“ack”; NA; NB; KB}KA :
The identiCer I should also appear in B’s decoy message. Third parties may deduce
that the messages are linked, because I is outside the encryptions, but cannot relate
the messages to A and B.
• Suppose that A wishes to communicate with several principals, B1; : : : ; Bn. It could
initiate n instances of the protocol. However, combining the messages from all the
instances can be faster. In particular, although each of B1; : : : ; Bn should receive a
di;erent nonce, they can all share a connection identiCer. Moreover, when KA is
long, its public-key encryption may be implemented as a public-key encryption of
a shorter symmetric key K plus an encryption of KA using K ; the key K and the
latter encryption may be the same for B1; : : : ; Bn. Thus, A may send:
“hello”; I; {KA}K ; {“hello”; H (KA); NA1; K}KB1 ; : : : ;{“hello”; H (KA); NAn; K}KBn ;
where H is a one-way hash function. Most importantly, the need for decoy messages
is drastically reduced. A principal that plays the role of B need not produce n true
or decoy acknowledgments, but only one. SpeciCcally, B should reply to a ciphertext
encrypted under KB, if A included one in its message, and send a decoy message
otherwise. This last optimization depends on our assumption that B can recognize
whether a ciphertext was produced by encryption under KB.
We have not attempted a careful analysis of these variants, or a thorough study of
alternative designs (for instance, with other treatments of identiCers). There are oppor-
tunities for further work in these directions.
With these and other improvements, both protocols are practical enough in certain
systems, although they do not scale well. Suppose that principals wish to communicate
with few other principals at a time, and that any one message reaches few principals,
for instance because messages are broadcast within small locations; then it should be
possible for principals that come into contact to establish private, authenticated connec-
tions (or fail to do so) within seconds. What is “few”? A simple calculation indicates
that 10 is few, and maybe 100 is few, but 1000 is probably not few. Typically, the lim-
iting performance factor will be public-key cryptography, rather than communications:
each public-key operation takes a few milliseconds or tens of milliseconds in software
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on modern processors (e.g., [28]). Perhaps the development of custom cryptographic
techniques (Navors of broadcast encryption) can lead to further eFciency gains.
4.5. Groups
In the problem described above, the set of principals SA and SB with which A and B
wish to communicate, respectively, are essentially presented as sets of public keys. In
variants of the problem, SA, SB, or both may be presented in other ways. The protocols
can be extended to some situations where a principal wants to deal with others not
because of their identities but because of their attributes or memberships in groups, such
as “ACME printers” or “Italians”. These extensions are not all completely satisfactory.
• Suppose that B is willing to communicate with any principal in a certain group,
without having a full list of those principals. However, let us still assume that SA is
presented as a set of public keys. In this case, we can extend our protocols without
much trouble: A can include certiCcates in its encrypted message to B, proving its
membership in groups.
• Suppose that, instead, A wants to communicate with any principal in a certain group,
and SB is presented as a set of public keys. The roles in the protocols may be reversed
to handle this case.
• However, the protocols do not address the case in which neither SA nor SB is pre-
sented as a set of public keys, for example when both are presented as groups.
Introducing group keys should reduce this case to familiar ones, but group keys are
harder to manage and protect.
5. The applied pi calculus (overview)
The applied pi calculus is a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value
passing, primitive function symbols, and equations between terms. In [2], we introduce
this calculus, develop semantics and proof techniques, and apply those techniques in
reasoning about some security protocols. This section gives only a brief overview. Later
sections return to private authentication, relying on the applied pi calculus.
5.1. Syntax and informal semantics
A signature  consists of a Cnite set of function symbols, such as h and decrypt,
each with an integer arity. Given a signature , an inCnite set of names, and an inCnite
set of variables, the set of terms is deCned by the grammar:
U; V;W ::= terms
a; n; : : : name
x; y; : : : variable
f(U1; : : : ; Ul) function application
where f ranges over the function symbols of  and l matches the arity of f. We
use meta-variables u and v to range over both names and variables. We write U =V
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to indicate that U and V are equal in an underlying equational theory associated
with .
The grammar for processes is similar to the one in the pi calculus, except that here
messages can contain terms (rather than only names) and that names need not be just
channel names:
P;Q; R ::= processes (or plain processes)
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
n:P name restriction (“new”)
if U = V then P else Q conditional
u(x):P message input
u〈V 〉:P message output
The null process 0 does nothing; P |Q is the parallel composition of P and Q; the
replication !P behaves as an inCnite number of copies of P running in parallel. The
process n:P makes a new name n then behaves as P. The conditional construct if
U =V then P else Q is standard, but we should stress that U =V represents equality,
rather than strict syntactic identity. We abbreviate it if U =V then P when Q is 0.
Finally, the input process u(x):P is ready to input from channel u, then to run P
with the actual message replaced for the formal parameter x, while the output process
u〈V 〉:P is ready to output message V on channel u, then to run P. In both of these,
we may omit P when it is 0.
Further, we extend processes with active substitutions:
A; B; C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
n:A name restriction
x:A variable restriction
{x=V} active substitution
We write {x=V} for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term V .
The substitution {x=V} typically appears when the term V has been sent to the
environment, but the environment may not have the atomic names that appear in V ; the
variable x is just a way to refer to V in this situation. The substitution {x=V} is active
in the sense that it “Noats” and applies to any process that comes into contact with
it. In order to control this contact, we may add a variable restriction: x:({x=V} |P)
corresponds exactly to let x=V in P. Although the substitution {x=V} concerns only
one variable, we can build bigger substitutions by parallel composition. We always
assume that our substitutions are cycle-free. We also assume that, in an extended
process, there is at most one substitution for each variable, and there is exactly one
when the variable is restricted.
A frame is an extended process built up from active substitutions by parallel com-
position and restriction. Informally, frames represent the static knowledge gathered by
the environment after communications with an extended process. We let ’ range over
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frames, and let ’(A) be the frame obtained from the extended process A by erasing
all plain subprocesses of A. We let dom(’) be the set of variables deCned by substitu-
tions in ’ and not restricted in ’. As usual, names and variables have scopes, which
are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. When E is any expression, fv(E), dv(E),
bv(E), fn(E), and bn(E) are the sets of free, deCned, and bound variables and free and
bound names of E, respectively; E is closed when every variable is either bound or
deCned by an active substitution. An evaluation context C[ ] is an extended process
with a hole in the place of an extended process. The context C[ ] closes A when C[A]
is closed.
We rely on a sort system for terms and extended processes [2, Section 2]. We
always assume that terms and extended processes are well-sorted and that substitutions
and context applications preserve sorts.
5.2. Examples
We further explain the applied pi calculus with examples motivated by our second
protocol. We start with formatted messages. We then discuss one-way hash functions
and encryption functions.
In that protocol, we use two kinds of formatted messages (“hello” and “ack”) with
two and three variable Celds, respectively. Accordingly, we introduce binary and ternary
function symbols hello( ; ) and ack( ; ; ) in the signature ; these symbols represent
the message constructors. In addition, we introduce inverse, unary function symbols
hello. 0 ( ), hello. 1 ( ), ack. 0 ( ), ack. 1 ( ), and ack. 2 ( ) in order to select particular
Celds in messages. Finally, we describe the intended behavior of formatted messages
with the evident equations:
hello. 0 (hello(x0; x1)) = x0;
hello. 1 (hello(x0; x1)) = x1;
ack. 0 (ack(y0; y1; y2)) = y0;
ack. 1 (ack(y0; y1; y2)) = y1;
ack. 2 (ack(y0; y1; y2)) = y2:
A Crst equational theory may consist of these equations, and all equations obtained
by reNexivity, symmetry, and transitivity and by substituting terms for the variables
x0; : : : ; y2.
In order to model the one-way hash computation of a session key out of the nonces
NA and NB, we introduce a binary function symbol h( ; ) with no equations. The fact
that h(NA; NB)= h(N ′A ; N
′
B) only when NA =N
′
A and NB =N
′
B models that h is collision-
free. The absence of an inverse for h models the one-wayness of h. In our protocol,
these properties are important to guarantee that h(NA; NB) is indeed secret (as long as
NA or NB is) and, further, that the attacker cannot recover NA or NB even if it obtains
h(NA; NB).
In order to model symmetric cryptography (that is, shared-key cryptography), we
may introduce binary function symbols encrypt( ; ) and decrypt( ; ) for encryption
and decryption, respectively, with the equation:
decrypt(encrypt(x; y); y) = x: (1)
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Here x represents the plaintext and y the key. We often use the notation {U}V instead
of encrypt(U; V ). For instance, the (useless) process K:c〈{U}K〉 sends the term U
encrypted under a fresh key K on channel c. It is only slightly harder to model asym-
metric (public-key) cryptography, where the keys for encryption and decryption are
di;erent. In addition to encrypt( ; ) and decrypt( ; ), we introduce the unary function
symbol pk( ) for deriving a public key from a private key. Instead of (1), we use the
equation:
decrypt(encrypt(x; pk(y)); y) = x: (2)
Since there is no inverse for pk( ), a public key pk(s) can be passed to the environment
without giving away the capability to decrypt messages encrypted under pk(s).
For instance, a principal B with public key KB can be represented as a process in a
context PB[ ]
def= s: ({KB = pk(s)} | [ ]) that binds a decryption key s and exports the
associated encryption key as a variable KB. As this example indicates, we essentially
view  as a generator of unguessable seeds. In some cases, those seeds may be directly
used as passwords or keys; in others, some transformations are needed.
5.3. Operational semantics
Given a signature , we equip it with an equational theory (that is, with an equiva-
lence relation on terms with certain closure properties). We write  	 U =V when the
equation U =V is in the theory associated with . We usually keep the theory implicit,
and abbreviate  	 U =V to U =V when  is clear from context or unimportant. We
write (U =V )’ when U and V are equal after applying ’, with %-conversion on names
and variables bound in ’ and free in U or V [2, Section 4.2].
Structural equivalences, written A≡B, relate extended processes that are equal by
rearrangements of parallel compositions, restrictions, and active substitutions, and by
equational rewriting of terms. Formally, structural equivalence is deCned as the smallest
equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed by %-conversion on both
names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts, and such that:
PAR-0 A ≡ A | 0;
PAR-A A | (B | C) ≡ (A | B) | C;
PAR-C A | B ≡ B | A;
REPL !P ≡ P |!P;
NEW-0 n:0 ≡ 0;
NEW-C u:v:A ≡ v:u:A;
NEW-PAR A | u:B ≡ u:(A | B) when u =∈ fv(A) ∪ fn(A);
ALIAS x:{x=V} ≡ 0;
SUBST {x=V} | A ≡ {x=V} | A{x=V};
REWRITE {x=U} ≡ {x=V} when  	 U =V:
We say that a variable x can be derived from the extended process A when, for some
term V and extended process A′, we have A≡{x=V} | A′. Intuitively, if x can be
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derived from A, then A does not reveal more information than x:A, because the context
can build the term V and use it instead of x.
Reductions, written A→B, represent silent steps of computation. Reduction is de-
Cned as the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural equivalence
and application of evaluation contexts such that:
COMM a〈x〉:P | a(x):Q → P | Q;
THEN if U = U then P else Q → P;
ELSE if U = V then P else Q → Q
for any ground terms U and V such that  0 U = V .
Labelled transitions, written A %−→B, represent interactions with the environment. They
consist of message inputs and message outputs, respectively written A
a(V )−−−→B and
A
u˜:a〈V 〉−−−−→B, with {u˜} ⊆ fv(V )∪ fn(V )\{a}. In both, a represents a communication
channel and V a message. In outputs, u˜ collects the names and variables revealed by
the message. The labelled transition relation is deCned as the smallest relation indexed
by labels % that is closed by structural equivalence and such that:
IN a(x):P
a(V )−−−→P{x=V} OUT a〈V 〉:P a〈V 〉−−−→P
OPEN-CHANNEL
A
a〈b〉−−−→A′ b = a
b:A
b:a〈b〉−−−−→A′
OPEN-VARIABLE
A
u˜:a〈V 〉−−−−−−→A′ x ∈ fv(V ) \ {u˜}; z fresh
x can be derived from u˜: ({z=V} | A′)
x:A
x;u˜:a〈V 〉−−−−→A′
SCOPE
A %−→A′ % is a〈V 〉 or a(V ); u does not occur in %
u:A %−→ u:A′
PAR
A
%−−−→A′ bv(%) ∩ fv(B)= bn(%) ∩ fn(B)= ∅
A | B %−→A′ | B
In contrast with some other process calculi, output transitions A
u˜:a〈V 〉−−−−→B are enabled
only for messages V that e;ectively reveal the names and variables in u˜. Typically,
the transition is just of the form A
x:a〈x〉−−−−→B for some fresh variable x, and B contains
an active substitution that associates x with a more complex message. Input transitions
A
a(V )−−−→B may use variables deCned in A (typically from previous message outputs) to
form the message V .
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5.4. Observational equivalences
In the analysis of protocols, we frequently argue that two given processes cannot be
distinguished by any context, that is, that the processes are observationally equivalent.
As in the spi calculus, the context represents an active attacker, and equivalences
capture security properties in the presence of the attacker. The applied pi calculus
has a useful, general theory of observational equivalence parameterized by  and its
equational theory [2]. SpeciCcally, the following three relations are deCned for any 
and equational theory:
• Static equivalence, written ’≈s  , relates frames with the same domain that cannot
be distinguished by any term comparison: dom(’)= dom( ) and, for all terms U
and V , we have (U =V )’ if and only if (U =V ) . Static equivalence is closed
by structural equivalence, by reduction, and by application of closing evaluation
contexts. In the presence of the  construct, this relation is somewhat delicate and
interesting. For instance, we have
N:{x= h(N; KB)} ≈s N:{x= h(N; KC)}
for any KB and KC , since the nonce N guarantees that both terms substituted for x
have the same (null) equational properties, but
N:{x= hello(N; KB)} ≈s N:{x= hello(N; KC)}
as soon as KB and KC di;er, since the comparison hello. 1 (x) =KB succeeds only
with the Crst frame.
• More generally, contextual equivalence relates extended processes that cannot be
distinguished by any evaluation context in the applied pi calculus, with any com-
bination of messaging and term comparisons. Observational equivalence coincides
with static equivalence on frames, but is strictly Cner on extended processes.
• Labelled bisimilarity, written ≈l, coincides with contextual equivalence, but it is
deCned in terms of labelled transitions instead of arbitrary evaluation contexts, and
it is the basis for standard, powerful proof techniques. We state our main results in
terms of ≈l. We recall its deCnition below.
De"nition 1. Labelled bisimilarity (≈l) is the largest symmetric relation R on closed
extended processes such that ARB implies:
(1) A ≈s B,
(2) if A→A′, then B→∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′,
(3) if A %−→A′ and fv(%)⊆ dom(A) and bn(%)∩ fn(B)= ∅, then B→∗ %−→→∗ B′ and
A′RB′ for some B′.
As usual, strong labelled bisimilarity (∼l) is deCned analogously, requiring B→B′
and B %−→B′ instead of B→∗ B′ and B→∗ %−→→∗ B′, respectively, in the bisimulation
clauses.
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6. The second protocol in the applied pi calculus
In this section we give a precise model for our second protocol (described in Sec-
tion 4.2) in the applied pi calculus: we Crst choose an adequate equational theory,
then detail our representation of principals and attackers, and Cnally give processes
that express the protocol.
We believe that the Crst protocol could be studied along similar lines. It introduces
one complication (the modelling of timestamps), but is otherwise much simpler.
6.1. An equational theory
The following grammar of terms indicates the function symbols and notation con-
ventions that we use:
T; U; V; V0; W; : : : ::= terms
A; B; K; x1; x2; : : : variable
c1; c2; initA; acceptB; connectA; : : : name (for a channel)
N; NA; K−1A ; : : : name (typically for a nonce or a key)
h(U; V ) cryptographic hash
pk(U ) public-key derivation
{T}V public-key encryption
decrypt(W;U ) private-key decryption
hello(U0; U1); ack(V0; V1; V2) constructor for protocol message
hello. 0 (U ) ; : : : ; ack. 2 (V ) Celd selector for protocol message
∅ empty set
U:V set extension
This grammar includes primitives for constructing sets (∅ and :) but not a set mem-
bership relation. We write V ∈W as an abbreviation for W:V =W .
Our equational theory is fairly standard. The equations on terms are:
decrypt({x}pk(z); z = x; private-key decryption,
hello. j (hello(x0; x1)) = xj; Celd selection in “hello” message,
ack. j (ack(x0; x1; x2)) = xj; Celd selection in “ack” message,
(∅:x):x = ∅:x; idempotence of set extension;
(x:y):z = (x:z):y; commutativity of set extension:
The equational theory implicitly assumes that encryption is which-key concealing, in
the sense that someone who sees a message encrypted under a public key K should
not be able to tell that it is under K without knowledge of the corresponding private
key K−1 (see Section 3.2). On the other hand, it would be easy to add functions
and equations that negate this property, in order to model additional capabilities of
an attacker. In particular, for the beneCt of the attacker, we could add the function
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symbols get-key, test-key, or same-key, with respective equations:
get-key({x}z) = z;
test-key({x}z ; z) = true;
same-key({x}z ; {y}z) = true:
These additions would not a;ect authentication and secrecy properties, but they would
compromise privacy properties.
6.2. The network and the attacker
In our model of the protocol, network messages are transmitted (asynchronously) on
the channels named c1 and c2. These represent two public communication channels, or
a single public channel, perhaps the ether, in which tags serve for di;erentiating traFc
Nows.
As explained in Section 3, we assume that an attacker can interpose itself on all
public communication channels. In our model, an arbitrary environment (an arbitrary
evaluation context) represents the attacker. This environment can interact with the
conCguration of principals using labelled transitions on any free channel name. We
obtain an attractively simple representation of broadcast communication: each mes-
sage is simply made available to the attacker, on a public channel, and the attacker
may then decide to transmit the message, again on a public channel, to one or more
principals.
As a special case, we sometimes model a weaker, passive attacker that only eaves-
drops on messages. An attack step—that is, eavesdropping on a message—amounts to
a message interception (formally, with an output label) followed by a re-emission of
the same message (with an input label). We write A
u˜:c[V˜ ]−−−−→A′ as a shorthand for the
sequence of two transitions A
u˜:c〈V˜ 〉−−−−→ c(V˜ )−−−−→A′. Here, u˜:c〈V˜ 〉−−−−→ shows an output of the
protocol and
c(V˜ )−−−−→ shows the same message being input.
6.3. The principals
We model arbitrary conCgurations of principals. Each principal may run any num-
ber of sessions and may perform other operations after session establishment or even
independently of the protocol. Only some of these principals are trustworthy. We are
interested in the security properties that hold for them.
Our model of a principal A has two parts: an implementation of the protocol, written
PA, and a “user process” (or “user protocol”), written UA. The user process deCnes
any additional behavior, such as when protocol runs are initiated and what happens
after each session establishment. It consumes the shared secrets produced during the
establishment of sessions and uses these secrets. According to the user process, each
principal may run several sessions of the protocol, possibly playing both the role of
initiator and that of responder. Of course, security properties depend on both PA and UA.
We deCne PA below in Section 6.4; on the other hand, we treat UA as a parameter.
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We use the following control interface between the (abstract) user process and the
(speciCc) session-establishment protocol. The interface concerns both the roles of ses-
sion initiator and responder.
init: UA sends initA〈B〉 to trigger a session-establishment attempt with principal B.
accept: PB sends acceptB〈A; K〉 to notify UB that it has accepted a session apparently
from principal A, with session key K .
connect: PA sends connectA〈B; K〉 to notify UA that its attempt to contact principal B
succeeded, with session key K .
In addition, for each principal B, the set SB represents all acceptable interlocutors
for B. For simplicity, we do not provide an interface for updating this set, so it remains
constant (and therefore not under the control of UB). Thus, the interface between the
session-establishment protocol and the user process for each principal X consists of
the communication channels VX
def= {initX , acceptX , connectX } plus a (constant) set of
principals SX . These channels can be restricted (with ) in order to hide the interface
from the environment.
Note that the interface provides a key K to the user process, rather than nonces NA
and NB. We prefer to deCne K in such a way that NA and NB cannot be computed from
K (for example, K = h(NA; NB)). Our results can thus be independent of how the user
process applies K .
As suggested in the informal description of the protocol, we represent the identity of
each principal as its public key, using variables A; B; : : : for both identities and public
keys. For the present purposes, the essence of a principal lies in its ability to decrypt
any message encrypted under its public key. Accordingly, we associate a context of
the form
PKA [ ]
def= K−1A :({A= pk(K−1A )} | [ ])
with every principal identity A. This context restricts the use of the decryption key K−1A
to the process in the context and it exports the corresponding public key. Whenever
we put a process R in this context, our intent is that R never communicates K−1A to
the environment.
By deCnition of well-formed conCgurations in the applied pi calculus, a process
of the form C[PKA [R]] exports A, only R can access K−1A , and we cannot apply a
context that would redeCne A. On the other hand, C[ ] can deCne any number of other
principals. Thus, we obtain a fairly generous and convenient model when we represent
an attacker by an arbitrary context.
For example, the process PKA [0] indicates that A is a principal whose decryption
key is never used. This process concisely models an absent principal.
6.4. The protocol
In this section we give a formal counterpart to the description of message Nows of
Section 4.2.
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Messages: We rely on substitutions in order to deCne the protocol messages and the
key derivation, as follows:
+1
def= {x1 = {hello(NA; A)}B};
+2
def= {x2 = {ack(NA; NB; B)}A};
+◦2
def= {x2 =NB};
+K
def= {K = h(NA; NB)}:
Although NA and NB are free here, they represent fresh nonces. They will be bound in
any process that introduces these substitutions. The substitution +◦2 corresponds to the
responder’s decoy message, in which here we use a name rather than a ciphertext, for
simplicity.
Syntactic sugar: We sometimes use the following abbreviations.
For testing, we write if U1 =V1 and U2 =V2 then P else Q for the process if U1 =V1
then (if U2 =V2 then P else Q) else Q, and rely on other similar abbreviations.
For decryption, we use pattern matching on message contents. SpeciCcally, we write
if x = {ack(NA; NB; B)}A using K−1A then P else Q
for the process
NB:
({NB = ack. 1(decrypt(x; K−1A ))} |
if x = {ack(NA; NB; B)}A then P else Q
)
with the assumption that NB =∈fv(Q), and we use analogous abbreviations with A and
NA. Here, we use the identiCers NA and NB as variables rather than names, locally.
For Cltering duplicate messages, we write
!c1(x\V ): if x fresh then P else Q
for the process
c:(c〈V 〉 | !c1(x):c(s):( Uc〈s:x〉 | if x∈ s then Q else P));
where c is a fresh channel name and s is a fresh variable. We use channel c for
maintaining a set V of previously received messages; Q is triggered instead of P when
one of those messages is received again.
Processes: The following code represents the protocol. It includes deCnitions of
processes for the initiator role and for the responder role. We write A for the initiator
and B for the responder, but the deCnitions apply to every principal by renaming:
PA
def= IA | RA;
IA
def= !initA(B):NA:(c1〈x1+1〉 | I ′A);
I ′A
def= c2(x2): if x2 = {ack(NA; NB; B)}A using K−1A then connectA〈B; K+K〉;
RB
def= !c1(x1\∅): if x1 fresh and x1 = {hello(NA; A)}B using K−1B and
A∈ SB then NB: (c2〈x2+2〉 | acceptB〈A; K+K〉) else NB:c2〈x2+◦2 〉:
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Here, IA shows the initiator receiving a session request on channel initA and sending the
Crst protocol message; I ′A then shows the initiator receiving and checking a response,
and passing a session key on channel connectA if the response is satisfactory. On the
other hand, RB shows the responder receiving a message, processing it, responding, and
in some cases passing a session key on channel acceptB. Both IA and RB are replicated
processes.
As coded, the protocol has little resistance to multiplexing errors. In particular, the
initiator fails if the Crst response that it receives is not the expected one. We could
add retries without much diFculty, but this aspect of the protocol is mostly irrelevant
in the study of safety properties.
6.5. Con;gurations of principals
In our statements of security properties (not in the deCnition of the protocol itself),
we distinguish a particular Cnite, non-empty set C of compliant principals A; B; : : : .
A compliant principal A is one in which the decryption key K−1A is used exclusively
in the session-establishment protocol. The initial conCguration of a single compliant
principal A with user process UA is therefore an extended process of the form:
QA
def= VA:(UA | PKA [PA]) :
This extended process is parameterized by the set SA, and (at least) exports the variable
A and has free channels c1 and c2. In QA, by deCnition, UA does not have access to K−1A .
Combining several such extended processes, we obtain a global conCguration of the
form
∏
A∈C QA for any set of compliant principals C. Sometimes, however, we do not
need to distinguish the user processes of several compliant principals. We can instead
group them in a single (compound) user process U , letting U =
∏
A∈C UA. Then, letting
V=
⋃
A∈C VA, we consider conCgurations of the form:
P
def=
∏
A∈C
PKA [PA] ;
Q
def= V:(U | P):
We assume that the user processes of compliant principals (UA and U ) never commu-
nicate control channels (V) in messages. For instance, the process c1〈connectA〉 cannot
be the user process of a compliant principal. This assumption can easily be enforced
by the sort system.
We use P in Section 7 when we establish security properties that do not depend
on U , thus e;ectively regarding U as part of the attacker. We use Q in Section 8,
with additional hypotheses on U , when we study privacy.
7. Authentication and secrecy properties
We begin our analysis of the protocol with traditional properties, namely responder
authentication and session-key secrecy. We state and discuss the properties, leaving
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proofs for an appendix. Such standard properties are important, and often a prerequisite
for privacy properties. Moreover, their formulation in the applied pi calculus illustrates
the use of observational equivalence for expressing security properties. In contrast,
many other formalisms for similar purposes rely only on properties of traces, rather
than on equivalences.
For a given set of compliant principals C, we study runs of the protocol in the
presence of an active attacker, by examining transitions P
.−→P′ from the conCguration
P deCned above to some conCguration P′, where . is an arbitrary sequence of labels.
In our statements, we let ! and ’ abbreviate the series of actions and the equational
“net e;ect”, respectively, of a successful run of the protocol:
!−→ def= initA(B)−−−−→ x1 :c1[x1]−−−−−→ →∗ x2 :c2[x2]−−−−−→ → K:acceptB〈A;K〉−−−−−−−−−→ connectA〈B;K〉−−−−−−−−→;
’ def= NA:(+1 | NB:+2 | +K):
Thus, ! shows a message that initiates a session-establishment attempt from A to B,
then two messages x1 and x2 on channels c1 and c2, respectively, then some internal
steps, and Cnally two messages that represent the establishment of a session with a
key K at B and A, respectively. The environment learns x1 and x2 by eavesdropping.
According to the frame ’, x1 represents the “hello” message and x2 represents the
“ack” message; in addition, ’ binds K to its value h(NA; NB). Similarly, we let !− and
’− abbreviate the series of actions and the equational “net e;ect”, respectively, of a
failed (rejected) run of the protocol:
!−−→ def= initA(B)−−−−→ x1 :c1[x1]−−−−−→ →∗ x2 :c2[x2]−−−−−→ →;
’− def= (NA:+1) | (NB:+◦2 ):
We have that if A∈ SB then
P
!−→ Px1 | ’
else
P
!−−−−→ Px1 | ’−;
where Px1 is P updated so that RB holds an element x1 in the set of messages it has
received. Thus, P may perform a complete run of the protocol, and this run succeeds
if authorized by the responder and fails otherwise. More generally (in part because of
the replications in P), for any P′ such that P
.−→P′, we have that if A∈ SB then
P′ !−→ P′x1 | ’
else
P′
!−−−−→ P′x1 | ’−;
where P′x1 is a corresponding update of P
′. These results express the functional cor-
rectness of the protocol. They hold independently of whether encryption is which-key
concealing.
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The Crst theorem relates the two possible outcomes of an actual run to a “magical”
outcome ’◦ def= N1:{x1 =N1} | N2:{x2 =N2} where the two intercepted messages are
trivially independent of the principals A and B and of the established key.
Theorem 2 (Key freshness for complete runs). Let A; B∈C.
(1) (Success:) If P
.−→P′ and A∈ SB, then P′ !−→≈l P′ | ’◦ | N:{K =N}.
(Failure:) If P
.−→P′ and A =∈ SB, then P′ !
−
−→≈l P′ | ’◦.
(2) Conversely, if P !−→P′′, then A∈ SB and P′′≈lP | ’◦ | N:{K =N}.
For instance, if A∈ SB then P !−→Px1 | ’, as explained above; in this case the
theorem yields Px1 | ’ ≈l P | ’◦ | N:{K =N}, so the environment cannot distinguish
the actual messages and key (on the left-hand side) from fresh, independent names (on
the right-hand side). The active substitution N:{K =N} exports the simplest deCnition
of a fresh secret key, a fresh name, rather than an expression computed from x1
and x2.
Interestingly, ’◦ and N:{K =N} do not depend on A and B at all, so this theorem
implies a Crst privacy guarantee: one does not learn anything about A and B from ’◦ |
N:{K =N}, and hence from ’. The equivalences ≈l are used for rewriting P′x1 | ’ and
P′x1 | ’−, by simplifying ’ and ’− and by erasing x1 from the set of messages that
RB has received, returning to the process P′ and hiding that a run has occurred. These
equivalences hold only if encryption is which-key-concealing. Otherwise, we would
obtain only
P′x1 | ’ ≈l P′x1 | (NA:+1) | (NANB:+2) | (N:{K =N}):
On the right-hand side, we are left with messages x1 and x2 that contain the public keys
of A and B. Nonetheless, NA and NB are bound around +1 and +2, so the independence
of the session key is still guaranteed.
A direct corollary concerns two instances PA and PB of the protocol in the initial
state. This corollary emphasizes the transitions observed by an environment with no
access to the control channels.
PA |PB | initA〈B〉 → x1 :c1[x1]−−−−−−→→∗ x2 :c2[x2]−−−−−−→→ ≈l
PA | PB | ’◦ |
{
N: (acceptB〈A; N 〉 | connectA〈B; N 〉; ) if A ∈ SB;
0 if A ∈ SB:
Intuitively, when we erase control messages, we obtain the same trace and equational
e;ect whether or not A∈ SB.
We also obtain a complementary authentication property:
Theorem 3 (Responder authentication). Suppose that P
.−→P′ and (1) P .−→P′ has
no internal communication step on c1 and c2; (2) P′ has no immediate output on
channel acceptB.
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If connectA〈B; K〉 occurs in ., then P !−→ .
′
−→P′ for some permutation !.′ of ..
In the statement of the theorem, we rely on %-conversion and assume that the names
and variables in processes and labels never clash. With this standard assumption, the
commutation of two transition steps (when enabled) can be written simply as the
commutation of their labels. Conditions 1 and 2 are technically convenient for avoiding
special cases in the statement of the theorem, but they are not essential. Condition 1
rules out traces where a message on c1 or c2 is not intercepted by the attacker, and is
instead transmitted internally. (Formally, any internal communication A→A′ on channel
ci implies that A
xi:ci[xi]−−−−→A′′ with A′≡ xi:A′′.) Condition 2 rules out traces where the
transition acceptB in ! has not occurred and is enabled in P
′.
In light of the results above, we can interpret this theorem partly as a correspondence
assertion: whenever A receives a connection message after a protocol run, apparently
with B, we have that
(1) A initiated the session with B;
(2) B accepted the session with A;
(3) both parties are now sharing a fresh key K , as good as a fresh shared name;
and
(4) intercepted messages x1 and x2 are seemingly unrelated to A, B, and K .
8. Privacy properties
In this section, we focus on privacy properties. For this purpose, we need to consider
the behavior of user processes, not just the protocol itself (see Section 4.3). For a
given set of compliant principals C, we address the question of whether an attacker can
distinguish two (compound) user processes U1 and U2 when we place these processes in
the context V:([ ]|P) that provides local access to the session-establishment protocol.
Therefore, indistinguishability for user processes depends on the identity-protection
features of the protocol, and it is coarser than ordinary observational equivalence ≈l
(that is, indistinguishability in all evaluation contexts).
For instance, if U1 and U2 each contain a message initA1〈B1〉 and initA2〈B2〉, and if
U1 and U2 “behave similarly” once a session is established, then U1 and U2 are indis-
tinguishable in this speciCc sense. On the other hand, we have initA1〈B1〉≈l initA2〈B2〉
only if A1 =A2 and B1 =B2.
In order to capture this notion of indistinguishability without having to pick par-
ticular user processes, we introduce a special labelled transition system and a notion
of bisimulation. We obtain a general result in terms of that notion of bisimulation,
then derive some privacy properties as corollaries. Thus, for the study of a particular
protocol, we develop a special notion of observation of user processes. In contrast,
in recent, related work [4,3], we take a standard notion of observation, and develop
communication protocols that are secure with respect to it (and which, for instance,
rely on “noise” messages in order to hide communication patterns between compliant
principals).
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We adopt the following notation convention. We write A, B for principals in the set
of compliant principals C, and E for a principal not in C.
8.1. A labelled transition system
Next we deCne labelled transitions for user processes with control state. The control
state records the sets SB of acceptable interlocutors and abstractly keeps track of the
sessions being negotiated. The labelled transitions reNect only what the environment
can observe about these sessions, Cltering out identity information.
Formally, a control state 1 consists of two functions, one that maps each principal
B∈C to a set SB, and the other a Cnite map from integers to entries t. The entries are
of four kinds:
• A B: a session o;er from A to B not yet considered by B.
• A B Ki: a session o;er from A to B accepted by B with key Ki (when A∈ SB).
• A B− : a session o;er from A to B rejected by B (when A =∈ SB).
• A E: a session o;er from A to some non-compliant principal E.
For any 1 and any integer i not in 1’s domain, we let 1[i → t] be the control state
that extends 1 by mapping i to t. We assume that the keys Ki are all distinct. We let
V1 be the union of V with the keys Ki for all integers i in the domain of 1.
We pair a process with a control state, with the notation 1:U . We assume that Ki
is free in U only if 1 maps i to an entry of the form A B Ki. (In Q, the user process
U may have free variables deCned by P, such as variables A and B that represent
compliant principals, or Ki for a computed key. When we consider transitions of U or
1:U , we treat these variables as names.)
Such a pair 1:U may have the three sorts of transitions 1:U
2−→ 1′:U ′ that we deCne
next: ordinary transitions, blinded transitions, and external transitions.
• Ordinary transitions are essentially those of the process U . Let 3−→ range over →
and %−→ for all labels % that do not contain control channels or bind keys Ki (that
is, fn(%)∩V1 = ∅ and bn(%)∩ (C∪V1)= ∅). We have:
LIFT
U 3−→U ′
1:U 3−→1:U ′
:
• The attacker can blindly intercept all messages sent on public channels by the prin-
cipals in C and resend any of these messages later. SpeciCcally, the attacker can
notice new session attempts, make responders consider session o;ers (either genuine
or fake), and make initiators consider intercepted “ack” messages. These attacker
actions are correlated with messages on restricted control channels, which the at-
tacker cannot observe directly. Accordingly, we reNect these actions using blinded
transitions init i−−−−→, accept i−−−−→, acceptB(A)−−−−−−→, and connect i−−−−→:
INIT
U
initA〈B〉−−−−→U ′
1:U init i−−−−→1[i →A B]:U ′
:
M. Abadi, C. Fournet / Theoretical Computer Science 322 (2004) 427–476 453
ACCEPT:
1[i →A B]:U accept i−−−−→
{
1[i →A B Ki]:U | acceptB〈A; Ki〉 if A ∈ SB;
1[i →A B− ]:U if A ∈ SB:
ACCEPT-FAKE:
1:U
acceptB(A)−−−−−−→
{
1:U | N:acceptB〈A; N 〉 if A ∈ SB;
1:U if A ∈ SB:
CONNECT:
1[i →A B Ki]:U connect i−−−−→1:Ki: (U | connectA〈B; Ki〉);
1[i →A B− ]:U connect i−−−−→1:U:
• In addition, compliant principals may be willing to open sessions with non-compliant
ones. These sessions are also mediated by the protocol, even if they are transparent
to the attacker who can in principle decrypt all messages in these sessions. We re-
Nect these actions using external transitions
iE:initA〈i; E〉−−−−−−−−→, acceptB(W;V )−−−−−−−−→, connectA(i; E; V )−−−−−−−−→,
where E is a variable and V and W are terms such that fn(V )∩V1 = fn(W )∩V1 = ∅:
INIT-E
U
E:initA〈E〉−−−−−−→U ′
1:U
iE:initA〈i;E〉−−−−−−→1[i →A E]:U ′
when (E = B)’(U ′) for all B∈C:
ACCEPT-E: 1:U
acceptB(W;V )−−−−−−−−→1:U | acceptB〈W;V 〉
when (W = A)’(U )
for some A∈ SB\C:
CONNECT-E: 1[i →A E]:U connectA(i;E;V )−−−−−−−−→1:U | connectA〈E; V 〉:
8.2. Private bisimulation
In order to express hypotheses on the observable properties of user processes, we
deCne an ad hoc notion of bisimulation:
De"nition 4. Private bisimilarity (≈C) is the largest symmetric relation R on extended
processes with control state such that, whenever T1R T2 with T1 = 11:U1 and T2 = 12:U2,
we have:
(1) V11 :U1≈s V12 :U2,
(2) if T1→T ′1 , then T2→∗ T ′2 and T ′1 R T ′2 for some T ′2 ,
(3) if T1
2−→T ′1 and fv(2)⊆ dom(V11 :U1) and bn(2)∩ fn(V12 :U2)= ∅, then
T2→∗ 2→→∗ T ′2 and T ′1 R T ′2 for some T ′2 .
This deCnition is an adaptation of that of weak labelled bisimilarity for the applied pi
calculus (DeCnition 1 in Section 5.4). The three clauses are analogous to those for the
applied pi calculus; the main novelty here is that
2−→ ranges over di;erent transitions
in clause 3.
We also let ” range over initial control states, that is, control states that have no
session entries and only deCne sets SB for B∈C. We write P(”) for the protocol P
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with these sets SB. When ” is clear from context, we may write (as usual) P instead
of P(”).
Our main privacy result states that, if two user processes are privately bisimilar
(under our new notion of bisimulation), then the two corresponding conCgurations are
observationally equivalent from the environment’s point of view. As we show below,
this result provides an e;ective proof technique for privacy properties.
Lemma 5 (Privacy). If ”1:U1≈C ”2:U2, then
V:(U1 | P(”1)) ≈l V:(U2 | P(”2)):
The hypothesis ”1:U1≈C ”2:U2 deals with arbitrary user processes and sets SB, and
is typically not diFcult to establish in particular cases. Importantly, its statement does
not depend on any detail of the session-establishment protocol, only on its control
interface. The conclusion V: (U1 | P(”1)) ≈l V: (U2 | P(”2)) then says that two
composite systems, each with a user process, are indistinguishable.
The converse of Lemma 5 does not quite hold, at least because the deCnition of
labelled transitions is conservative in some respects. (For instance, in that deCnition,
we safely presume that the attacker has a private key associated with any value E that
U employs to identify a non-compliant principal.) Thus, user processes that are not
privately bisimilar may still be part of indistinguishable systems. Such user processes
can be excluded with additional hypotheses.
8.3. Applications of the privacy lemma
One may formulate and prove many speciCc privacy properties for the protocol. The
various properties may di;er, in particular, on which user processes and sets SB they
consider. We give a series of simple examples of such properties. In the examples, the
hypotheses can usually be made less demanding, and more speciCc and complicated.
The proofs follow directly from Lemma 5.
We begin with a basic example that concerns the anonymity of failed sessions.
Provided that U never inputs on channel initX for any X ∈C, if A =∈ SB and A′ =∈ SB′ ,
then replacing initA〈B〉 with initA′〈B′〉 in U does not a;ect Q up to observational
equivalence.
The next result deals with a single initial session attempt, and states that the session
attempt may not compromise any private bisimilarity that would hold after establishing
the session.
Theorem 6 (Equivalent sessions). For j=1; 2, let
Uj
def
= initAj〈Bj〉 | connectAj (Bj; K):Vj;
U ′j
def
= K: (acceptBj〈Aj; K〉 | Vj)
with Aj; Bj ∈C and Aj ∈ SBj in ”j. If ”1:U ′1≈C ”2:U ′2, then ”1:U1≈C ”2:U2.
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For any user processes V1 and V2 that do not use the control channels, the private
bisimilarity hypothesis holds as soon as K:V1≈l K:V2. With this additional assumption
and Lemma 5, we have a corollary expressed in terms of standard labelled bisimilarity:
we obtain that if K:V1≈l K:V2 then V: (U1 | P(”1))≈l V: (U2 | P(”2)).
A further privacy property concerns compliant principals that attempt to open ses-
sions with one another but do not perform any action observable by the attacker after
establishing a session. (They may for instance use private channels, or public channels
with adequate decoys.) We may describe any such conCguration of principals in C by
a parallel compositions of initA messages with A∈C, plus the sets (SB)B∈C. In this
special case, we easily characterize the equivalence of two conCgurations:
Theorem 7 (Silent sessions). Let U1 and U2 be parallel compositions of messages
initA〈X 〉 with A∈C. If
(1) U1 and U2 contain the same number of messages,
(2) U1 and U2 contain exactly the same messages initA〈W 〉 for W =∈C, and
(3) the sets SB\C are identical in ”1 and ”2,
then V: (U1 | P(”1))≈l V: (U2 | P(”2)).
In order to prove the theorem, we may establish ”1:U1≈C ”2:U2 by enumerating
a few blinded and external transitions, then apply Lemma 5. Conversely, the three
hypotheses seem necessary for the conclusion, since the attacker can count the number
of “hello” messages, can decrypt “hello” messages sent to principals outside C (as
long as W is a public key not in C), and can attempt to establish a session with any
B∈C.
We can derive other similar privacy results for uniform families of user processes,
such as processes that do not use any principal identity after establishing sessions.
Our Cnal result relates a conCguration with a present but silent principal to a con-
Cguration with an absent principal. (This theorem does not require Lemma 5; it has a
simple, direct bisimulation proof.)
Theorem 8 (Absent principal). Assume that |C|¿1, and let X =∈C and SX = ∅. We
have
Q | VX :PKX [PX ] ≈l Q | PKX [0] :
The process on the left-hand side is structurally equivalent to a conCguration Q′ with
compliant principals C∪{X }; the process on the right-hand side includes an absent
principal (a principal X whose decryption key is never used). Hence, one may Crst
use private bisimilarity to show that X is apparently not involved in any session in Q′,
then apply Theorem 8 to substitute an absent principal for X . (Conversely, if C= {}
or C= {A}, then the addition of any instance of the protocol is observable.)
9. Related problems and related work
The questions treated here are related to traFc analysis, and how to prevent it. This
subject is not new, of course. In particular, work on message untraceability has dealt
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with the question of hiding (unlinking) the origins and destinations of messages (e.g.,
[15,32,33]). It has produced techniques that allow a principal A to send messages to
a principal B in such a way that an adversary may know the identities of A and B
and their locations, but not that they are communicating with one another. Those tech-
niques address how to route a message from A to B without leaking information. In
the case of cellular networks, those techniques can be adapted to hide the locations of
principals [18,34]. In contrast, here we envision that all messages are broadcast within
a location, simplifying routing issues, and focus on hiding the identities of principals
that meet and communicate at the location. Other interesting work on untraceability
in mobile networks has addressed some important authentication problems under sub-
stantial infrastructure assumptions, for instance that each principal has a home domain
and that an authentication server runs in each domain [30,36,9]. That work focuses
on the interaction between a mobile client and an authentication server of a domain
that the client visits, typically with some privacy guarantees for the former but not
for the latter. In contrast, we do not rely on those infrastructure assumptions and we
focus on the interaction between two mobile principals with potentially similar privacy
requirements.
There has been other research on various aspects of security in systems with mobility
(e.g., [14,40,39] in addition to [18,25,30,36,11,9], cited above). Some of that work
touches on privacy issues. In particular, the work of Jakobsson and Wetzel points
out some privacy problems in Bluetooth. The protocols of this paper are designed to
address such problems.
The questions treated here are also related to the delicate balance between privacy
and authenticity in other contexts. This balance plays an important role in electronic
cash systems (e.g., [23]). It can also appear in traditional access control. SpeciCcally,
suppose that A makes a request to B, and that A is member of a group that appears in
the access control list that B consults for the request. In order to conceal its identity,
A might use a ring signature [35] for the request, establishing that the request is
from a member of the group without letting B discover that A produced the signature.
However, it may not be obvious to A that showing its membership could help, and B
may not wish to publish the access control list. Furthermore, A may not wish to show
all its memberships to B. Thus, there is a conNict between privacy and authenticity in
the communication between A and B. No third parties need be involved. In contrast,
we do not guarantee the privacy of A and B with respect to each other, and focus on
protecting them against third parties.
Designated veriCer proofs address another trade-o; between conCdentiality and au-
thenticity [24]. They allow a principal A to construct a proof that will convince only
a designated principal B. For instance, only B may be convinced of A’s identity. Des-
ignated veriCer proofs di;er from the protocols of this paper in their setup and ap-
plications (e.g., for fair exchange). Moreover, in general, they may leak information
about A and B to third parties, without necessarily convincing them. Therefore, at least
in general, they need not provide a solution to the problem of private authentication
treated in this paper.
More broadly, this paper is partly a contribution to the formal study of security
protocols and of their properties. In recent years, the understanding of basic security
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properties such as integrity and conCdentiality has become both deeper and wider. There
has also been substantial progress in the design and veriCcation of protocols that aim to
guarantee these properties. On the other hand, fundamental tasks such as secure session
establishment remain the subject of active, productive research. Moreover, properties
beyond integrity and conCdentiality have been studied rather lightly to date. These
properties include, for example, protection of identity information and protection against
denial-of-service attacks. They may seem secondary but they are sometimes important.
The literature contains many other formal treatments of protocols. We will not at-
tempt to survey that work here, but mention only the two most relevant papers. One of
them is our original paper on the applied pi calculus [2], which considers session estab-
lishment and some of its properties, and which includes additional references. The other
is a recent paper by Hughes and Shmatikov that deCnes several notions of anonymity
and privacy [22]. A preliminary version of that paper [38] sketches—in just a few
sentences—an analysis of the protocol that is the subject of this paper. Hughes and
Shmatikov develop a special formal framework for protocols, communication graphs.
Despite some thematic overlap, the applied pi calculus appears to be richer than com-
munication graphs. In particular, communication graphs do not include an account of
user processes. While the deCnitions of anonymity and privacy seem appropriate and
useful for communication graphs, it is not yet entirely clear whether and how they
would carry over to the applied pi calculus and other settings.
10. Conclusions
Security protocols can contribute to the tension between communication and privacy,
but they can also help resolve it. In this paper, we construct two protocols that allow
principals to authenticate with chosen interlocutors while hiding their identities from
others. In particular, the protocols allow mobile principals to communicate when they
meet, without being monitored by third parties. The protocols resemble standard ones,
but interestingly they rely on some non-standard assumptions and messages to pursue
non-standard objectives. As virtually all protocols, however, they are only meaningful
in the context of complete systems. They are part of a growing suite of technical and
non-technical approaches to privacy.
We also analyze one of the protocols in the applied pi calculus. We cover standard
authenticity and secrecy properties and also privacy (identity protection) properties.
The formulation of these properties mainly relies on equivalences, which express in-
distinguishability in an arbitrary context. Our analysis concerns not only the core of
the protocol but also its composition with a user process, since this composition may
endanger privacy properties. Thus, we examine the protocol under several hypotheses
on user processes. We obtain several related results that transfer hypotheses on user
processes to security properties of complete systems.
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Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs for the results of Sections 7 and 8 about the
second protocol. It partly relies on deCnitions and proof techniques for the applied pi
calculus [2]. As could be expected, the proofs require the consideration of many details
(sometimes abbreviated in this presentation); mechanical support for such proofs may
be useful in the future.
We Crst give a co-inductive proof technique for establishing labelled bisimilarity in
the applied pi calculus. Recall that ∼l is the strong variant of labelled bisimilarity. We
write →d for the subset of → that corresponds to term-comparison steps and inputs
on Clter channels in the protocol—these steps are deterministic and commute with any
other step, so they can almost be considered part of structural equivalence in weak
bisimulation proofs.
Lemma 9 (Bisimulation proofs up to context, deterministic steps, and strong bisimi-
larity). To establish that R⊆≈l, it su2ces to show that R meets the conditions in
the de;nition of ≈l (De;nition 1) modi;ed as follows: In conditions 2 and 3, instead
of A′RB′, we have A′→∗d ∼l C[A′′], B′→∗d ∼l C[B′′], and A′′RB′′ for some extended
processes A′′ and B′′, and some evaluation context C[ ].
The proof is a standard variation of the proof that ≈l is closed by application of
closing evaluation contexts (see [2]).
A.1. State translation
For a given set of compliant principals C, we translate (that is, we compile) each
abstract control state to a speciCc state of the process that implements the session-
establishment protocol. We Crst reCne the abstract state and deCne auxiliary substitu-
tions, then give the translation, and Cnally state lemmas on the frames that appear in
the translation.
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We reCne the abstract state 1 so that it keeps track of additional transient states for
the protocol P. (Intuitively, the attacker can do less in the reCned states 1, so these
states need to appear only in transition invariants of the proofs.)
• We supplement 1 with a third map from B∈C to Cnite sets of messages FB already
received in RB (and terms representing those sets). This map is not modiCed in
transitions between processes with control state.
• For each entry t, we introduce another entry ?t to represent the same session state
as t but with no subprocess I ′A (typically a state after I
′
A received a wrong message).
We write ?t for t or ?t.
In extended processes with control states 1:U , whenever 1 maps i to an entry ?t with
target B (that is, t=A B, t=A B Ki, and t=A B− ), and 1 maps B to FB, we assume
that (x1i =∈FB)’(U )—in the translation below, x1i is selectively added to FB. We also
assume that ?A B Ki and ?A B − occur in 1 only if A∈ SB in 1 and A =∈ SB in 1,
respectively, and that A E occurs in 1 only if E =∈C.
We let +◦K
def= N:{K =N} and +◦1 def= {x1 =NA}. We use indexed substitutions +1i, +◦1i,
+2i, +◦2i, +Ki, and +
◦
Ki instead of those deCned in Section 6.4 to represent multiple
instances of the substitutions with distinct free names and variables. (For instance, +2i
is +2 with deCned variable x2i and free nonces NAi; NBi instead of x2 and NA; NB.)
We translate 1:U into the extended process Q(1:U ) deCned as follows:
Q(1:U ) def= V1:(U | P(1));
P(1) def=
∏
A∈C
PKA
[
IA | RA(SA; F ′A)
∏
(i →?t)∈1; t=A:::
S(i →?t)
]
;
F ′B
def= FB unionmulti {x1i | 1 = 1′[i → ?A B (Ki or −)]};
S(i →?A B) def= NAi: (+1i |?I ′Ai);
S(i →?A B Ki) def= NAi: (+1i |?I ′Ai | NBi: (+2i | +Ki));
S(i →?A B− ) def= NAi: (+1i |?I ′Ai) | NBi:+◦2i | +◦Ki;
S(i → A E) def= I ′Ai{B=E};
where ?I ′Ai
def= I ′Ai when ? is nil and ?I
′
Ai
def= 0 when ? is ?, and where RA(SA; F ′A ) is
RA with sets SA of acceptable interlocutors and F ′A of messages in the cache (instead
of ∅). In particular, we have P(”)≡P and Q(”:U )≡Q as deCned in Section 6.5.
The state translation P(1) deCnes the variables
dv(P(1)) = C unionmulti ⋃
(i →?t)∈1

{x1i} when t = A B;
{x1i ; x2ij ; Ki} when t = A B Ki or t = A B− ;
∅ when t = A E:
We let D def=
⋃
1 dv(P(1))—this co-inCnite set gathers all variables potentially exported
in P(1). When we write 1:U , we always assume that the variables in D\dv(P(1)) do
not occur in 1 and U .
At each stage of a session between compliant principals A and B, the corresponding
frame in the translation is given by  (i → ?t) def= S(i →?t). Except for the indexing on
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deCned variables,  (i → A B Ki) coincides with ’ and  (i → A B − ) coincides with
’− | N:{K =N} as deCned for the theorems of Section 7. We also deCne auxiliary
frames for fake messages to B with terms V instead of a nonce and W instead of a
public key:
8(V;W B) def= NB: ({x2 = {ack(V; NB; B)}W} | {K = h(V; NB)});
8◦ def= NB:+◦2 | +◦K :
A.2. Invariant lemma
Next, we systematically write down the protocol states and their transitions, using
the distinguished states P(1).
In the lemma below, we rely on the following notation conventions. Equality on
terms is to be interpreted in the frame associated with P(1) (so U =V stands for
(U =V )’(P(1))). When we use structural equivalence to make explicit some restric-
tions within P′, we always assume that the bound names and variables do not clash
with P(1) and %.
Lemma 10. The transitions P(1) %−→P′ are those enumerated below, with the fol-
lowing properties of P′. (We also mention the corresponding transition rules of Sec-
tion 8.1, if any.)
• P(1) initA(X )−−−−→P′ for any A ∈ C. For each fresh index i, we have subcases depending
on X :
(1) P′≡ x1i : (c1〈x1i〉 | P(1[i →A B])) if X =B∈C.
(2) P′≡ x1i : (c1〈x1i〉 | NAi: (+1i{B=E} | P(1[i →A E]))) if X =E =∈C.
(These cases correspond to special transitions INIT and INIT-E.)
• P(1) c1(X1)−−−−→P′. For each B∈C, we have subcases depending on 1 and X1:
(3) If 1= 1′[i → ?A B] and X1 = x1i for some i, then we have
P′→+d x2iKi:
(
c2〈x2i〉 |
{
P(1′[i → ?A B Ki]) | acceptB〈A; Ki〉 if A ∈ SB;
P(1′[i → ?A B− ]) if A ∈ SB:
)
:
For the other subcases, let 1′ be 1 with X1 added to FB.
(4) If X1 =∈F ′B and X1 = {hello(V;W )}B for some terms V and W with W ∈ SB, we
have P′→+d P(1′) | x2; K: (c2〈x2〉 | acceptB〈V; K〉 | 8(V;W B)).
(5) Otherwise, we have P′→+d P(1′) | NB:c2〈x2+◦2 〉.
(These transitions do not depend on “?”, and always add X1 to B’s ;lter.
Case 3 corresponds to the two branches of ACCEPT. Case 4 covers both the
;rst branch of ACCEPT-FAKE and ACCEPT-E. Case 5 covers the second branch
of ACCEPT-FAKE.)
• P(1) c2(X2)−−−−→P′. For each i such that 1= 1′[i → t], we have subcases depending on
t and X2:
(6) t=A B Ki, X2 = x2i, and we have P′→dP(1′[i →?t]) | connectA〈B; Ki〉;
t=A B− , X2 = x2i, and we have P′→dP(1′[i →?t]).
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(7) t=A B or, for any X2 = x2i, t=A B Ki or t=A B− . Then, we have
P′→dP(1′[i →?t]).
(8) t=A E, X2 = {ack(NAi; V; E)}A for some term V . Then, we have
P′→dP(1′) | connectA〈E; h(NAi; V )〉.
(9) t=A E for any other X2, and we have P′→dP(1′).
(Cases 6 and 8 correspond to rules CONNECT and CONNECT-E.)
Proof. The proof follows from our deCnition of translated states, and is by case analysis
on the input preCxes in P(1). (P(1) has neither internal steps nor outputs.) We detail
the following cases:
• P(1) initA(X )−−−−→P′ is a replicated input of IA.
• P(1) c1(X1)−−−−→P′ is a replicated input of RB for some B∈C. The deterministic steps →+d
consist of a communication on the local channel c to read F ′B followed by a se-
ries of tests on X1 in RB: a test for freshness X1 =∈F ′B , one for pattern matching
X1 = {hello(NA; A)}B in a context that deCnes {NA = hello. 0(decrypt(X1; K−1B ))} and
{A= hello. 1(decrypt(X1; K−1B ))}, and one for authorization A∈ SB.
3. The freshness test succeeds by hypothesis x1i =∈F ′B when i → ?AB (with X1 added
to F ′B in the resulting state). By equational rewriting and structural equivalence,
the pattern matching succeeds with A bound in PKA [ ] and NA =NAi bound in
S(i → ?A B). If A∈B, the resulting subprocess is
x2iKi: (c2〈x2i〉 | NBi: (+2i | +Ki | acceptB〈A; Ki〉)):
If A =∈B, we use 0≡ Ki:+◦Ki and obtain by structural equivalence
x2iKi: (c2〈x2i〉 | NBi:+◦2i | +◦Ki):
In any case, we rely on the hypothesis on D and structural equivalence to lift
the restriction on x2i and Ki to the top level of the translation.
4. The three tests succeed, each using a hypothesis in the case deCnition, with X1
added to FB in the resulting state. (The hypothesis X1 =∈F ′B implies X1 = x1i for
any i with target B in the domain of 1.)
5. If the freshness test fails, then 1= 1′. Otherwise, X1 = x1i for any i with target B
in the domain of 1, and X1 is added to FB. In any case, a fresh decoy message
is sent.
• P(1) c2(X2)−−−−→P′ is a single input in a subprocess I ′Ai of P(1), which corresponds to
some A∈C and entry i → t in 1 (not i →?t). After the test, I ′Ai is replaced with
either a message on connectA or the null process 0 and we conclude by structural
equivalence.
We detail the test in the pattern matching of I ′A in the cases i →A B Ki and
i →AB− with two subcases depending on A∈ SB. (The cases i →AB and i →AE
are similar.) Since NAi and K−1A are bound in P(1), we can assume that they do
not syntactically occur in X2. Let X be a term such that fn(X )∩{NAi; K−1A }= ∅,
and V and W be any terms. We have:
◦ X (+1i | +2i | +Ki | {A= pk(K−1A )})= {ack(NAi; V;W )}A succeeds if and only
if X = x2i.
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◦ X (+1i | +◦2i | +◦Ki) | {A= pk(K−1A )})= {ack(NAi; V;W )}A always fails.
6. The test in I ′A succeeds or fails according to t, as detailed above. When the test
succeeds, we rely on structural equivalence and the active substitution +Ki in
 (i → A B Ki) to replace the key computation triggered in I ′Ai by the deCned
variable Ki.
7. The test fails and yields 0=?I ′Ai.
8. The test succeeds and yields a connect message.
9. The test fails and yields 0.
A.3. Equational properties
The next lemmas relate frames appearing in the protocol implementation; they cru-
cially rely on which-key concealment.
Lemma 11. We have the following static equivalences:
PKA [0] | 8(V; A B)≈s PKA [0] | 8◦; (A.3)
PKB [0] | NAi:+1i≈s PKB [0] | NAi:+◦1i ; (A.4)
PKA [0] | PKB [0] |  (i → A B Ki)
≈sPKA [0] | PKB [0] |  (i → A B− ): (A.5)
Proof. Within our equational theory, we check that, for all terms with free variables
in the domain of the related frames, the substituted terms are “equationally inert”, that
is, do not enable any additional rewrite step.
Equivalence A.3 is an instance of:
s; NB:
 {A= pk(s)} |{x2 = {ack(V; NB;W )}pk(s)} |
{K = h(V; NB)}
 ≈s s;M; N:
 {A= pk(s)} |{x2 =M} |
{K =N}
 ;
where V and W range over arbitrary terms (up to ≡ and supposing s =∈ fn(V;W )).
Consider two terms V1, V2 with fv(Vi)⊆{A; x2; K} and fn(Vi)∩{s; NB;M; N}= ∅. Let
+ and +◦ be the two plain substitutions obtained from the frames above by discarding
restrictions. We show that V1+=V2+ i; V1+◦=V2+◦ by structural induction on V1
and V2. For each axiom in the equational theory, we check the correspondence of
rewrite steps after applying either substitution: as regards x2, for instance, the rule for
decryption does not apply to x2 because the key term is not equal to s; the rule for Celd
selection does not apply to x2 because the encrypted message is not a plain message
constructor.
Equivalence A.5 is obtained from equivalence A.3 (with A and B swapped) by
indexing K and x2 with i and applying the context PKA [0] | NAi: (+1i | ).
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Equivalence A.4 follows from a more general static equivalence:
s; NA:
( {B= pk(s)} |
{x1i = {hello(NA; V )}pk(s)}
)
≈s s;M:
( {B= pk(s)} |
{x1i =M}
)
where V is an arbitrary term, with a similar proof.
By composing these static equivalences in evaluation contexts, we obtain that the
frame associated with any state of the protocol is equivalent to a frame that deCnes
all its variables as distinct fresh names, and is thus equationally inert:
Lemma 12. ’(P(1))≈s
∏
x∈dv(P(1))
N:{x=N}.
Proof. For a given 1, let Is= {i | (i → ?ABsi)∈ 1} where s is nil, K , or −. We have:
P(1) def=
∏
A∈C
PKA
[
PA |
∏
(i →?t)∈1;t=A:::
S(i →?t)
]
≈s
∏
A∈C
PKA [0] |
∏
I
 (i →?A B) |∏IK (i →?A B Ki) |∏I− (i →?A B− )
(A.4)
≈s
∏
A∈C
PKA [0] |
∏
I
 (i → A B) | ∏
IK∪I−
 (i → A B− ) (A.5)
≡ ∏
A∈C
PKA [0] |
∏
I∪IK∪I−
NAi:+1i |
∏
IK∪I−
(NBi:+◦2i | +◦Ki)
≈s
∏
A∈C
PKA [0] |
∏
I∪IK∪I−
NAi:+◦1i |
∏
IK∪I−
(NBi:+◦2i | +◦Ki) (A.6)
≈s
∏
A∈C
N:{A=N} | ∏
I∪IK∪I−
NAi:+◦1i |
∏
IK∪I−
(NBi:+◦2i | +◦Ki) (A.7)
≡ ∏
x∈dv(P(1))
N:{x=N}; (A.8)
where (A.4) is obtained by erasure of plain subprocesses PA and I ′A followed by struc-
tural equivalence (since the decryption key does not occur anywhere except in its
deCnition); (A.5) follows from Lemma 11(A.5) for each i∈ IK ; (A.6) follows from
Lemma 11(A.4) for each i∈ I ∪ IK ∪ I−; (A.7) follows from s:{A= pk(s)}≈s N:
{A=N}. (A.8) is a renaming of bound names.
From Lemma 12, we obtain that, for any compliant user processes U and U ′ and
any label % such that bv(%)∩D= ∅, we have:
(1) if U %−→U ′ considering the variables dv(P(1)) as distinct fresh names, then
U |P(1) %−→U ′|P(1).
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(2) if U |’(P(1)) %−→U ′′|’(P(1)), then U %−→U ′ considering the variables dv(P(1))
as distinct fresh names, with U ′|’(P(1))≡U ′′|’(P(1)).
The next lemma lifts Lemma 11 from frames to translated states:
Lemma 13. For any extended control state 1 and A; B∈C, we have
P(1) | 8(V; A B) ∼l P(1) | 8◦: (A.9)
Let 1= 1′[i →A B Ki] and 11i be 1′ with x1i added to FB. We have
P(11i) | NA:+1i ≈l P(1′) | NA:+◦1i ; (A.10)
P(11i) |  (i → A B Ki) ≈l P(11i) |  (i → A B− ): (A.11)
Proof.
(A.9): Let 8 abbreviate 8(V; A B). By deCnition, we have
8 def= NB: ({x2 = {ack(V; NB; B)}A} | {K = h(V; NB)});
8◦ def= N:{x2 =N} | N:{K =N}:
For a given 8, let R be the relation that contains (A.9) for all 1. We show that
R is a strong bisimulation up to context and conclude using (a strong variant of)
Lemma 9.
The static equivalence requirement is Lemma 11(A.3) in context. The strong bisimu-
lation requirements are easily established using the case analysis of Lemma 10: in each
case, it suFces to check that all tests in P(1) yield the same results when placed in
parallel with 8 and with 8◦.
We detail cases 6–9 of Lemma 10 when 1= 1′[i → t], which cover all transitions
leading to a decryption attempt of x2 with a decryption key that matches the encryption
key A used in 8. (For all other transitions, the static equivalence of Lemma 11(A.3)
suFces to conclude.) In the frames of P(1) | 8 and P(1) | 8◦, we have x2 = x2i by
Lemma 12, and thus case 6 is excluded. Similarly, in both frames, x2 = {ack(NA; V; E)}A
for any E =∈C, since x28◦ is not an encrypted message and x28 has a third Celd B =E,
and thus case 8 is excluded. In case 7, we obtain processes related by R for the control
state 1′[i →?t]. In case 9, we obtain processes related by R for the control state 1′.
(A.10): The proof similarly relies on Lemmas 9–11. We use a candidate relation R
that contains all pairs
P(11i)|NA:+1iRP(1′)|NA:+◦1i ; (A.12)
P(11i)|NA:+1iRP(11i)|NA:+◦1i : (A.13)
Cases 3–5 of Lemma 10 cover all potential decryption attempts of x1i as a “hello”
message with decryption key K−1B . In P(1
′) | NA:+◦1i, the message x1i passes the
freshness test but fails the pattern matching (the message is a nonce, not an encrypted
message), a decoy is generated, and x1i is added to FB. For all other processes related by
R, we have x1i ∈F ′B , so the message fails the freshness test, a decoy is generated, and
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the protocol state is left unchanged. Thus, we are always in case 5 and obtain on each
side the processes related on line (A.13) in the evaluation context [ ] | NB:c2〈x2+◦2 〉.
Other transitions are handled using Lemma 11(A.4).
(A.11): Similarly, x1i ∈FB always excludes the decryption of x1i, and the test in pattern
matching of cases 6 and 8 always fails on x2i, either because the Crst nonce is
di;erent from the expected one or because the message is not encrypted under A.
Other transitions are handled using Lemma 11(A.5).
A.4. Proofs of Section 7
While its statement is optimized for the proof of Lemma 5, Lemma 10 also provides
precise syntactic support for establishing the theorems of Section 7. We Crst relate the
results of arbitrary transitions of P to state translations in context:
Lemma 14. If P
.−→P′, then P′→∗d ≡C[P(1)] for some control state 1 and eval-
uation context C[ ], where C[ ] is obtained by composing the evaluation contexts
appearing in Lemma 10 and deleting their messages as they are consumed by output
transitions and internal communication steps on c1 and c2.
Proof. By induction on ., deCnition of (ordinary) labelled transitions, Lemma 10, and
subcommutation of →d with any other transition: if P1 .−→P′ and P1→∗d ≡C[P(1)],
then for some P′′ and .′ obtained from . by deleting →d-steps, we have P′→∗d ≡P′′
and C[P(1)]
.′−→≡P′′. The transition label (or, in case of an internal communication
on channels c1 or c2, the message consumed in C[ ]) and the input preCx in P(1)
determine the case in Lemma 10.
The next theorem corresponds to the discussion before Theorem 2; it uses the same
notation conventions.
Theorem 15 (Complete runs). Let A; B∈C.
(1) (Success:) If P
.−→P′ and A∈ SB, then P′ !−→P′x1 | ’.
(Failure:) If P
.−→P′ and A =∈ SB, then P′ !
−
−→P′x1 | ’−.
(2) Conversely, if P !−→P′′, then A∈ SB and P′′≡Px1 | ’.
Proof of Theorem 15. We Crst apply Lemma 14 to obtain P′→∗d ≡C[P(1)]. From the
translation state P(1), we exhibit a particular trace !−→ (or !
−
−→), up to %-conversion
to erase indices in bound variables in the trace and avoid clashes with C[ ]. We then
check that C[P(1)] (by construction) and Cnally P′ (by commutation of each →d step
occurring in P′→d ≡C[P(1)] with !−→) have the same trace.
The trace is obtained by composing the following transitions:
• transition 1 of Lemma 10 for some index i fresh in 1, leading to P(1[i →A B]) in
evaluation context x1i : (c1〈x1i〉 | );
• x1i :c1〈x1i〉−−−−−−→ that discards this evaluation context;
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• transition 3 with X1 = x1i, leading (after →+d ) to P(1[i →A B Ki]) in evaluation
context x2iKi: (c2〈x2i〉 | | acceptB〈A; Ki〉);
• x2i :c2〈x2i〉−−−−−−→ that discards the evaluation context x2i : (c2〈x2i〉 | ) and leaves
P(1[i →A B Ki]) in evaluation context Ki: ( | acceptB〈A; Ki〉);
• transition 6 for i →A B Ki leading (after →+d ) to P(1[i →?A B Ki]) in evaluation
context Ki: ( | acceptB〈A; Ki〉 | connectA〈B; Ki〉);
• K:acceptB〈A;K〉−−−−−−−−→ connectA〈B;K〉−−−−−−−−→ (after %-converting Ki to K) that discard the evaluation
context given above and leave just P(1[i → i →?A B Ki])=P(1)x1 | ’;
and, when A =∈B, similar initial Cve transitions leading to
Ki:(P(1[i →?A B− ])) ≡ P(1)x1 | ’−:
To prove the second part of the theorem, we apply Lemma 14 for the labels ! and
check that, after each labelled transition, there is a unique reachable state translation
up to ≡ that enables the rest of the trace.
Proof of Theorem 2. It suFces to relate the processes obtained by Theorem 15 and
Lemma 14 to those appearing in the statement of Theorem 2, that is, to show that
C[P(1)x1 ] | ’ ≈l C[P(1)] | ’◦ | N:{K =N}
≈l C[P(1)x1 ] | ’− | N:{K =N}:
Moreover, for some evaluation context C′[ ], we have
C[P(1)x1 ] | ’ ≡ C′[P(1)x1 | ’]
and similarly for the other frames. Since ≈l is closed by application of evaluation
contexts, it suFces to show that
P1 = P(1)x1 | ’
≈l P2 = P(1) | ’◦ | N:{K =N}
≈l P3 = P(1)x1 | ’− | N:{K =N}:
Finally, P1≈l P3 is Lemma 13(A.11) and P2≈l P3 is Lemma 13(A.10) in evaluation
context [ ] | NB:{x2 =NB} | N:{K =N}.
Proof of corollary after Theorem 2. For all processes A, we have that A
a(V )−−−→A′ implies
A | a〈V 〉→A′ and (for asynchronous outputs) A x:a〈x〉−−−−→A′ implies A≡ x:(A′ | a〈x〉).
We apply Theorem 2 (Success), then use these remarks and the context-closure property
of ≈l for the evaluation context K:(connectA〈B; K〉 | acceptB〈A; K〉 | ). We Cnally
discard N:{K =N} by structural equivalence.
Proof of Theorem 3. We apply Lemma 14 to obtain P(”)
.−→→∗d ≡C[P(1)] and use
the case analysis of Lemma 10. Starting from the Crst transition
connectA〈B;W 〉−−−−−−−−→ that occurs
in . (for any term W ), and going backwards, we successively identify preliminary input
transitions that must appear in the trace and correspond to the Crst branch of case 6,
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case 3 with A∈ SB, and case 1 of Lemma 10. Hypothesis (1) in the theorem guarantees
that no input transition described in Lemma 10 depends on C[ ].
• This Crst connect transition commutes with any preceding transition (as given by
Lemma 10) that does not introduce the message connectA〈B;W 〉 in C[ ]. The only
transitions that introduce such message are described in Lemma 10, case 6, and
enabled only by an input of x2i for some index i with state t=A B K .
• For this index i, we identify the two other input transitions in . that yield the states
t=A B and t=A B K at index i.
• The outputs of the messages x2i and x1i introduced by these transitions necessarily
precede their input in ..
• Hypothesis (2) ensures that the message acceptB〈A; K〉 introduced by case 3 with
A∈ SB yields an output transition acceptB〈A;K〉−−−−−−−−→ in ..
Once we have identiCed ! as a subtrace of ., we easily check that each of these
transitions commute with any other preceding transition in ., using again Lemma 10.
A.5. Proofs of Section 8.2
We Crst reCne our notion of private bisimilarity to deal with reCned control states and
give some basic properties as regards failed sessions, then we prove (a generalization
of) our main result.
So far, private bisimilarity is deCned only for processes with control states as deCned
in Section 8.2. The next lemma relates the control states of bisimilar processes:
Lemma 16 (Related control states). If 11:U1≈C 12:U2, then 11 and 12 have identical
domain, and yield session states tz of the same kind: either both Az Bz, or both
Az Bz Ki or Az Bz −, or both A E with the same A∈C and E =∈C.
Proof. This property follows from the deCnition of transitions that operate on 1z. We
apply the simulation hypothesis of private bisimilarity (DeCnition 4(3)) to speciCc
transitions
2−→ that characterize the structure of 1. For instance, for any index i, we
have 1:U
accept i−−−→1′:U ′ if and only if (i →A B)∈ 1 for some A; B∈C.
We now extend our deCnitions of labelled transitions and private bisimilarity to user
processes with reCned control state.
• T 2−→T ′ is deCned as in Section 8.1 (and leaves the sets FB unchanged), except that
rule ACCEPT is extended to operate on failed states ?t:
ACCEPT
1[i → ? A B]:U accept i−−−−→
{
1[i → ? A B Ki]:U | acceptB〈A; Ki〉 if A ∈ SB;
1[i → ? A B− ]:U if A ∈ SB:
Conversely, “initiator” rules CONNECT and CONNECT-E are deCned as before, and do
not operate on entries ?t.
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• 11:U1≈C12:U2 is deCned as in DeCnition 4 with two additional requirements:
4. For all B∈C, the sets FB in 11 and 12 are syntactically identical.
5. 11 and 12 have identical domain and yield entries of the same kind (as deCned
in Lemma 16) with ? at the same indices.
User processes with unreCned control states are closed under transitions, so our exten-
sion of ≈C coincides with DeCnition 4 for such processes.
The next lemma describes how to change parts of the reCned control state while
preserving private bisimilarity. These changes will be convenient to reNect changes in
the state of the protocol translation.
Lemma 17 (Control changes). For all well-formed extended processes with control
state, we have:
(1) For some B∈C and z=1; 2, let Tzx be Tz with the same term X1 added to FB. If
T1≈C T2, then T1x ≈C T2x.
(2) Let t1 and t2 be control states of the kind A B Ki or A B−.
If 11:Ki:U1≈C 12:Ki:U2, then 11[i →?t1]:U1≈C 12[i →?t2]:U2.
If 11[i → t1]:U1≈C 12[i → t2]:U2, then 11[i →?t1]:U1≈C 12[i →?t2]:U2.
(3) If 11[i →A E]:U1≈C 12[i →A E]:U2, then 11:U1≈C 12:U2.
Proof. For each private bisimilarity claim in the lemma, we easily show that the
relation R containing all processes that meet the hypothesis is a private bisimulation,
up to an injective re-indexing on the domain of 11 and 12 for the proof of 3.
(1) Our transitions are independent of FB.
(2) Conditions 1 in DeCnition 4 is structurally equivalent to condition 1
for both private bisimilarity hypotheses. Conditions 2 and 3 follow from the
direct correspondence between the transitions of 1[i →?t]:U and those of
1:Ki:U and 1[i → t]:U (although the latter processes have additional labelled
transitions).
(3) The proof is immediate, except for transitions with label i that “reuse” the index
of the discarded session (rules INIT and INIT-E). For those transition, we choose
another fresh index i′ and conclude up to injective re-indexing after the transitions.
Next, we relate transitions of translated protocol conCgurations to those of user
processes. In the lemma, we write Cz[ ] for the evaluation context around P( ) in
Lemma 10(z).
Lemma 18. Let T = 1:U . If Q(T ) %−→Q′ with fn(%)∩V1 = ∅ and bn(%)∩ (C∪V1),
then one of the following holds:
(1) U %−→U ′, with T %−→T ′= 1:U ′ and Q′≡Q(T ′).
(2) %= 9 and P(1) receives a message on initA for some A∈C, with two
subcases:
(a) U
initA〈B〉−−−−→U ′ for some B∈C and, for any fresh index i,
T init i−−−−→T ′= 1[i →A B]:U ′ and Q′≡C1[Q(T ′)].
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(b) U
E:initA〈E〉−−−−−−→U ′ and, for any fresh index i,
T
iE:initA〈i;E〉−−−−−−→T ′= 1[i →A E]:U ′ and Q′≡ E:C2[Q(T ′)].
(3) %= 9 and P(1) receives a message on c1 or c2.
(4) % is an input on c1 with ’(U ) | P(1) %−→P′ | ’(U ) and Q′≡ V1: (U | P′).
(5) % is an input on c2 with ’(U ) | P(1) %−→P′ | ’(U ) and Q′≡ V1: (U | P′).
Proof. By deCnition of (ordinary) transitions and Lemma 10, P(1) can at most input
on control channels (when U outputs on those channels) and network channels c1
and c2 (when either U or the environment output on those channels). For all other
transitions, we also have U |’(P(1)) %−→U ′′ |’(P(1)). By Lemma 12, this implies
U %−→U ′ (treating variables deCned in ’(P(1)) as distinct names) for some U ′ such
that Q′≡U ′ |P(1).
Case 2 of the lemma details an input on channel initA for some A∈C, corresponding
to an output in U . For any such output, we can introduce a fresh variable, E, use
structural equivalence to introduce an active substitution that deCnes E, and write the
output U
E:initA〈E〉−−−−−−−−→U ′. There are two subcases:
• If (E=B)’(U ′) for some B∈C, then we also have the free variable output
U
initA〈B〉−−−−→U ′′. Let 1′= 1[i →A B] for some fresh i. By rule INIT, we have
1:U init i−−−−→ 1′:U ′′. Using Lemma 10(1), we have P(1) initA(B)−−−−→C1[P(1′)] and Cnally
Q′≡C1[V1′ : (U ′′ |P(1′))].
• Otherwise, let 1′= 1[i →A E]. By rule INIT-E, we have U :1 iE:initA〈i; E〉−−−−−−−−→ 1′:U ′.
Using Lemma 10(2), we have P(1)
initA(E)−−−−→C2[P(1′)] and Cnally Q′≡E:
C2[V1′ : (U ′|P(1′))].
We are now ready to prove a privacy lemma that generalizes Lemma 5 to arbitrary
user processes with reCned control states.
Lemma 19 (Privacy with state). If T1≈C T2, then Q(T1)≈l Q(T2).
Proof. Our proof relies on the technique detailed in Lemma 9: we show that the
relation
R
def= {(Q(T1);Q(T2)) |T1≈C T2};
where Tz = 1z:Uz range over processes with reCned control states is a weak bisimulation
up to context, →d, and strong bisimilarity.
In order to establish the static equivalence requirement Q(T1)≈s Q(T2), we use
Q(Tz)
def= V1z : (Uz | P(1z))
≈s V1z : (Uz | (Nx)x∈D:{x˜= N˜x})
≡ (Nx)x∈D: ({x˜= N˜x} | V1z:Uz);
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where D def= dv(P(1z)) is the (identical) set of variables deCned in P(11) and P(12)
and D′ is the subset of D without the variables Ki—these key variables Ki appear in
V1z. The equivalences above follow from the deCnition of the translation, Lemma 12,
and structural rearrangement. Finally, we use the static equivalence requirement of
our private bisimilarity hypothesis, V11:U1≈s V12:U2, in the common context
(Nx)x∈D:({x˜= N˜ x}|[ ]).
The proof of the two weak bisimulation properties is by case analysis of the tran-
sitions Q(T1)
%−→Q′1 and their relation to the transitions of T1 (and U1) and those of
P(11), using the cases of Lemma 18 then Lemma 10.
(1) We detail the case % = 9. (The case Q1→Q′1 is essentially the same.)
By Lemma 18, we have T1
%−→T ′1 and Q′1≡Q(T ′1).
By private bisimilarity (DeCnition 4(3)), we have T2→∗ %−→→∗ T ′2 with
T ′1≈C T ′2.
Using rule LIFT, we carry over this series of transitions to U2 in the evaluation
context V12: ( | P(12)), and obtain Q(T2)→∗ %−→→∗ Q(T ′2) with Q(T ′1)RQ(T ′2).
(2) We use the subcases and notations of Lemma 18:
(a) By Lemma 18, we have T1
init i−−−−→T ′1 and Q′1≡C1[Q(T ′1)]. By private bisim-
ilarity for the transition T1
init i−−−−→T ′1 , we have T2 →∗ init i−−−−→ →∗ T ′2 with
T ′1 ≈C T ′2, for some T ′2 = 12[i →A2 B2]:U ′2.
By rules INIT and LIFT, we obtain transitions U2 →∗
initA2 〈B2〉−−−−−−−→ →∗ U ′2 and
Cnally Q(T2)→∗ C1[Q(T ′2)]. Relying on Lemma 9 (bisimulation up to con-
text), we discard the common evaluation context C1[ ] and conclude with
Q(T ′1)RQ(T
′
2).
(b) By Lemma 18, we have T1
iE:initA〈i;E〉−−−−−−→T ′1 and Q′1≡ E:C2[Q(T ′1 )].
We use private bisimilarity for the transition T1
iE:initA〈i;E〉−−−−−−→T ′1 , apply rules INIT-E
and LIFT to the resulting transitions, discard E:C2[ ], and conclude
similarly.
(3) We decompose internal communication steps on c1 or c2 into an output followed
by an input on that channel, up to a variable restriction. We rely on other cases
(twice) for simulating these transitions, remark that the resulting pair of labelled
transitions can be composed to form an internal step, and conclude up to context
for the variable restriction.
(4) We use the cases of Lemma 10 for input on c1:
Case 3: We have X1 = x1i with 11 = 1′1[i → ?A1 B1].
Let C3[ ]
def= x2i : (c2〈x2i | [ ]〉). Lemma 10 yields Q′1→+d C3[Q(T ′1)] with two
cases
T ′1 = 1
′
1[i → ?A1 B1 Ki]:U1 | acceptB1〈A1; Ki〉 or
T ′1 = 1
′
1[i → ?A1 B1 −]:U1 depending on A1 ∈ SB1 in 11.
Rule ACCEPT applies in both cases and yields T1
accept i−−−−→T ′1 .
By private bisimilarity, 12 = 1′2[i → ?A2 B2] for some A2; B2 ∈C, and we have
T2 →∗ accept i−−−−→→∗ T ′2 with T ′1 ≈C T ′2 and two cases
T ′2 = 1
′
2[i → ?A2 B2 Ki]:U ′2 with U2→∗ U ′2, or
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T ′2 = 1
′
2[i → ?A2B2−]:U ′2 with U2 | acceptB2〈A2; Ki〉→∗ U ′2 depending on A2 ∈ SB2
in 12 (but not on A1 ∈ SB1 in 11).
Using rule ACCEPT, rule LIFT, and Lemma 10, we build transitions
Q2→∗ %−→→∗d →∗ C3[Q(T ′2)]. We discard C3[ ] and conclude.
Case 4 when W =A, and
Case 5 with the same hypotheses except that A =∈ SB in 11:
Let U ′1 =U1 | N:acceptB1〈A1; N 〉 if A∈ SB in 11 and U ′1 =U1 otherwise. By rule
ACCEPT-FAKE, we have T1
acceptB(A)−−−−−−→T ′1 def= 11:U ′1.
By private bisimilarity, we obtain T2 →∗ acceptB(A)−−−−−−−→→∗ T ′2 and T ′1 ≈C T ′2, with
two cases in the application of ACCEPT-FAKE, depending on A∈ SB in 12.
For z=1; 2, let T ′zx be T
′
z with the additional message X1 in FB. Let M
def=N:c2〈N 〉.
In Case 4 (A∈ SB in 11), we have
Q′1 →+d x2; K: (c2〈x2〉 | Q(11x:U1 | acceptB〈A; K〉) | 8(V; A B))
∼l x2; K: (c2〈x2〉 | Q(11x:U1 | acceptB〈A; K〉) | 8◦)
≡ M | Q(T ′1x)
using equivalence (A.9) in Lemma 13. In case 5 (A =∈ SB in 11), we simply
have
Q′1 →+d M | Q(11x:U1) = M | Q(T ′1x):
For each of the two cases of A∈ SB in 12, we use rules LIFT and ACCEPT-FAKE
to build transitions Q2→∗ %−→→+d ∼l→∗M |Q(T ′2x), which implies Q2→∗
%→
→∗∼l M |Q(T ′2x).
By Lemma 17(1), we obtain T ′1x ≈C T ′2x. We discard M to conclude.
Case 4 when W ∈ SB\C in 11: By rule ACCEPT-E, we have
T1
acceptB(W;V )−−−−−−−−→T ′1 = 11:U1 | acceptB〈W;V 〉:
By private bisimilarity, T2 →∗ acceptB(W;V )−−−−−−−→ →∗ T ′2 with T ′1 ≈C T ′2. Moreover,
the condition of ACCEPT-E ensures that W ∈ SB\C in 12.
Let T ′1x; T
′
2x be obtained from T
′
1 ; T
′
2 by adding the message X1 to FB. By
Lemma 17(1), we also have T ′1x ≈C T ′2x.
Let C4[ ]
def= x2K: ([ ] | c2〈x2〉 | 8(V;W V )). By Lemma 10, we have
Q′1→+d C4[Q(T ′1x)]. Using rule LIFT, rule ACCEPT-E, and Lemma 10, we build
transitions Q(T2)→∗ %−→→∗C4[Q(T ′2x)]. We discard C4[ ] and conclude using
T ′1x ≈C T ′2x.
Case 5 except as above: Let T1x; T2x be obtained from T1; T2 by adding the mes-
sage X1 to FB (with no e;ect if X1 ∈FB already).
By Lemma 17(1), we obtain T1x ≈C T2x.
Let Cr[ ]
def= NB:c2〈NB〉 | [ ]. By Lemma 10, we have
Q′1 →+d Cr[Q(T1x)] and Q(T2)
c1(X1)−−−−→→+d Cr[Q(T2x)]:
We discard Cr[ ] and conclude using T1x ≈C T2x.
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(5) We use the cases of Lemma 10 for input on c2. Let 1′z[i → tz] = 1z for z=1; 2.
Case 6: By rule CONNECT, we have T1 = 1′1[i → t1]:U1 and T1 connect i−−−−−−→T ′1 =
1′1:Ki:U
′
1, with two cases for U
′
1 depending on t1: either t1 =A1 B1 Ki and
U ′1 =U1 | connectAz 〈Bz; Ki〉, or t1 =A1 B1 − and U ′1 =U1.
By private bisimilarity, we have T2→∗ connect i−−−−−−→→∗ T ′2 with T ′1 ≈C T ′2 and
moreover T2 = 1′2[i → t2]:U2 and T ′2≡ 1′2:Ki:U ′2.
Let T ′′z = 1
′
z[i →?tz]:U ′z . By Lemma 17(2), T ′1 ≈C T ′2 implies T ′′1 ≈C T ′′2 . By
Lemma 10, Q′1→d Q(T ′′1 ). By rule Lemma 10 and rules LIFT and CONNECT,
we obtain Q(T2)→∗ %−→→∗ Q(T ′′2 ). We conclude using T ′′1 ≈C T ′′2 .
Case 7: Let T ′z be Tz with a ? at index i. We have Q
′
1→d Q(T ′1) and
Q2
%−→→d Q(T ′2). By Lemma 17(2), T1≈C T2 implies T ′1 ≈C T ′2.
Case 8: By rule CONNECT-E, we have
T1 = 1′1[i →A E]:U1
connectA(i;E;V )−−−−−−−−→T ′1 = 1′1:U ′1
with U ′1 =U1 | connectA〈E; V 〉.
By private bisimilarity and rule CONNECT-E,
T2 = 1′2[i →A E]:U2 →∗
connectA(i;E;V )−−−−−−−−→→∗ T ′2 = 1′2:U ′2
and T ′1 ≈C T ′2 for some U ′2. Let T ′′z def= 1′z[i →?A E]:U ′z . By Lemma 10, we have
Q′1→d Q(T ′′1 ) and we build Q(T2)→∗ %−→→∗Q(T ′′2 ). By Lemma 17(3), we ob-
tain T ′′1 ≈C T ′′2 and conclude.
Case 9: Let T ′z be Tz without the session at index i. We have Q
′
1→d Q(T ′1) and
Q2
%−→→d Q(T ′2). By Lemma 17(3), T1≈C T2 implies T ′1 ≈C T ′2.
Proof of Lemma 5. This is a special case of Lemma 19, with initial control states ”z
instead of arbitrary control states 1z in T1 and T2.
A.6. Proofs of Section 8.3
Proof of the basic example. For any process with control state 1:U such that A =∈ SB
and i is fresh, we have the blinded transitions:
T def= 1:U | initA〈B〉 init i−−−−→ Ti = 1[i →A B]:U
accept i−−−−→ Tr = 1[i →A B− ]:U
connect i−−−−→ T ′ = 1:U:
For z=1; 2, assume Az; Bz ∈C with Az =∈ SBz , and let Tz be T with Az; Bz instead of
A; B. In order to show that T1≈C T2, we establish that the relation
R
def=
⋃
1:U
{(T1; T2); (T1i ; T2i); (T1r ; T2r)} ∪ ≈C
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is a private bisimulation. By construction, R is closed by the transitions detailed above.
Any other transition does not depend on the init message and leads to related processes
with control state, in the same case of the deCnition of R.
Proof of Theorem 6. Although each user process Uj initially attempts a single session,
the environment can trigger accept messages using transition rules ACCEPT-FAKE or
ACCEPT-E. For any given series of transitions derived from these rules, let Uaj be the
resulting user subprocess—this subprocess consists of accept messages and depends
only on these transitions and ”j. For any fresh index i, we have
Tj
def=”j:Uaj | Uj
init i−−−−→ ”j[i →Aj Bj]:Uaj | connectAj (Bj; K):Vj
accept i−−−−→ ”j[i →Aj Bj Ki]:Uaj | acceptBj〈Aj; Ki〉 | connectAj (Bj; K):Vj
connect i−−−−→ ”j:Ua | Ki:
(
acceptBj〈Aj; Ki〉 |
connectAj〈Bj; Ki〉 | connectAj (Bj; K):Vj
)
→ T ′j def= ”j:Uaj | U ′j :
We omit other, uniform transitions that extend Uaj or lead to the failure of the session.
Let R relate these extended processes with control state, except (T ′1 ; T
′
2).
From the hypothesis ”1:U ′1≈C ”2:U ′2, we show that T ′1 ≈C←∗ T ′2 by induction on the
series of transitions that yield Ua1 and Ua2. For each transition, we apply clause 3 in
the deCnition of private bisimilarity and remark that the labelled transition commutes
with any silent step. Similarly, we have T ′1 →∗≈C T ′2, and thus T ′1 ≈C T ′2.
Using T ′1 ≈C T ′2, we easily show that R∪≈C is a private bisimulation, and conclude
from the initial state T1≈C T2 when Ua1 =Ua2 = 0.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let U be a process of the form
∏n
i=1 initAi〈Xi〉. Since there is no
internal step and rule LIFT does not apply to control messages, any acceptB or connectA
message in parallel with U is inert. We let range over parallel compositions of such
messages.
The transitions of ”:U are interleavings of the following transitions:
(1) If Xi =B∈C then, independently of A and B, we have transitions
”:U ′ | initAi〈B〉
init i−−−→ accept i−−−−→ connect i−−−−→ ”:U ′ | :
(2) Otherwise, we have transitions
”:U ′ | initAi〈Xi〉
i:initAi 〈Xi〉−−−−−→ connect〈i;V 〉−−−−−−→ ”:U ′ | :
(3) Independently, we have transitions ”:U
acceptB〈E;V 〉−−−−−−−−→ ”:U | (if and only if E ∈ SB)
and ”:U
acceptA〈B〉−−−−−−→ ”:U | (whether or not A∈ SB).
Let R be the relation such that (1) (”1:U1 | ; ”2:U2 | )∈R for all ”1:U1 and ”2:U2
that meet the conditions of Theorem 7 and (2) R is closed by application to both
processes of any transitions appearing above in cases 1 and 2. The relation R is a
private bisimulation, so R⊆≈C. We conclude by Lemma 5.
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Proof of Theorem 8. In this proof, for all deCnitions, we use the set of compliant
principals Cunionmulti{X } with SX = ∅ (rather than C). In addition, we let P−(1) be the
translation state P(1) with 0 instead of PX . We use the candidate relation R deCned
by
{(VX :P(1); VX :P−(1)) | 1 extends ” and has no t initiated by X }:
We rely on Lemma 9 and the case analysis of Lemma 10. We conclude with 1= ”.
The processes on the left of R have extra transitions that use the replicated input
on c1 in PX (transition 3 with A =∈ SB for B=X in Lemma 10). These inputs can be
simulated on the right using transitions 5 with C ∈C—since the received message X1
meets the condition for transition 4 for at most one B∈C and |C|¿1, we can always
choose some C ∈C\{B}.
All other transitions are in direct correspondence, and lead to related processes for
an updated 1 in the same evaluation context. The condition on 1 is preserved by all
transitions up to context because initX is restricted and appears only in a replicated
input in P(1).
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